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Abstract
A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Facebook,
and Snapchat, have chosen to issue stock that does not allow their investors to vote
on corporate decisions. But scholars and investors are in fundamental disagreement
about whether nonvoting stock is a benefit or a curse. Critics argue that nonvoting
shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight and
therefore increase management agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that
even in spite of increased agency costs, nonvoting shares may provide benefits that
exceed these costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term
vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.
This paper offers a novel perspective on this debate. It demonstrates an
important and previously unrecognized benefit of nonvoting stock: it can be used to
make corporate governance more efficient. This is because nonvoting stock allows
companies to divide voting power between shareholders who are informed about the
company and its performance and those who are not. When this efficient sorting
happens, the company will lower its cost of capital by reducing agency and transaction
costs. Specifically, informed investors will pay more for voting stock that is not
diluted by uninformed investor voting; indeed, a company may even entice informed
investors to invest by offering two classes of shares. Likewise, uninformed investors
will more highly value shares that do not require them to incur costs associated with
voting. In other words, the company that issues nonvoting shares for its uninformed
shareholders to buy will make itself more valuable. And because nonvoting stock
trades at a discount to voting stock, uninformed shareholders will have another
reason to purchase nonvoting shares, obviating the need for legal intervention.
This insight has several implications for law. Most important, this paper
contends that recent proposals to restrict or deter companies from issuing nonvoting
shares should be rejected because they may impede efficient corporate structuring.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In March of 2017, Snap Inc. became the first company to go public on a U.S.
stock exchange offering only nonvoting shares to the public.1 This structure ensured
that the company’s founders, two billionaire internet entrepreneurs in their twenties,
would have perpetual control over the company.2 Not only that, issuing only
nonvoting stock allowed Snap to take advantage of exemptions from certain
disclosure obligations under federal securities laws.3 Specifically, the company would
not be required to release annual proxy statements to the public that would disclose
background information about the directors, including their compensation and any
conflicts of interest that could affect their decisionmaking.4 Why bother when the
company’s shareholders would never have a say in director elections or other matters
typically resolved by a shareholder vote?
The public reaction was swift and hostile.5 Some, including the company itself in
its registration statement, predicted that Snap would pay a penalty for such a move.6
And yet, the company encountered little resistance from the market. It priced its IPO
above the marketing range, and closed its first day of trading at a 44 percent
premium to the IPO price.7

Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017),
available
at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evanspiegel.html?_r=0.
2 See id. (noting that the offering is structured such that the “founders’ control goes away only if they
die.”); Snap Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement 130 (Feb. 16, 2017) (“As a
result [of this structure], Mr. Spiegel and Mr. Murphy, and potentially either one of them alone, have
the ability to control the outcome of all matters submitted to our stockholders for approval.”)
3 Snap Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 (explaining that the company would be exempt from
reporting requirements under Sections 13(d), 13(g), 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act). A subsequent
prospectus claimed that Snap would nonetheless voluntarily provide those materials to stockholders.
See
Preliminary
Prospectus,
available
at:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000119312517056992/d270216ds1a.htm.
4 Id.
5 See Solomon, supra note []; Maureen Farrell, In Snap IPO, New Investors to Get Zero Votes, While Founders
Keep Control, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-snap-ipo-new-investors-to-get-zero-voteswhile-founders-keep-control-1484568034; Paresh Dave, Big Investor T. Rowe Price Challenges
Snapchat
Founders’
Power,
LA
Times
(Jan
19,
2017),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snapchat-voting-20170119-story.html
6 Snap Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 (“We cannot predict whether this structure and the
concentrated control it affords Mr. Spiegel and Mr. Murphy will result in a lower trading price or
greater fluctuations in the trading price of our Class A common stock as compared to the trading
price if the Class A common stock had voting rights.”); Ross Kerber and Liana Baker, Lacking Voting
Rights, Snap IPO to Test Fund Governance Talk, REUTERS TECHNOLOGY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017) (quoting a
research analyst who stated that he would discount the shares by 30% because of the lack of voting
rights).
7 Maureen Farrell, Corrie Driebusch and Sarah Krouse, Snapchat Shares Surge 44% in Market Debut,
WALL ST. J. (March 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/snapchat-parent-snap-opens-higher-inmarket-debut-1488471695. Since then, the shares have fallen below the IPO price. Corrie Direbusch,
1
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The success of Snap’s offering, however, rallied opponents of companies that
issue different classes of stock with unequal voting rights, or “dual-class companies.”
These opponents contend that depriving investors of voting rights serves only to
entrench management and insulate them from the consequences of their inefficient
or disloyal decisions. These critics view the increase in dual-class offerings in the
United States as a serious problem for investors.8
Accordingly, following Snap’s IPO, the Council of Institutional Investors
(“CII”), an investor advocacy group with the motto “no-vote shares have no place in
public companies,” ramped up lobbying efforts, contending that U.S. stock indices
and exchanges should bar companies that offer nonvoting shares to the public.9 CII
also targeted companies contemplating public offerings with multiple classes of
stock.10 Large institutional investors likewise lobbied the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and stock exchanges to ban nonvoting shares.11 These efforts
caught the attention of the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee, which held a
hearing on dual-class stock shortly after Snap’s offering.12
This public opposition has begun to influence stock index policy. In June 2017,
FTSE Russell announced that it would not add Snap or other companies with
nonvoting shares to its major U.S. stock benchmarks.13 Soon after, S&P 500 Dow
Jones Indices stated that it would exclude companies that issue multiple classes of
shares.14 These decisions dealt a major blow to Snap and provide a powerful
Snap Shares Tumble Further Below IPO Price, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/snap-shares-tumble-further-below-ipo-price-1499784971.
8 See supra n. [].
9
See Council of Institutional Investors, The Rise of No-Vote Shares, available at:
http://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock. The CII has also directed its advocacy overseas, lobbying the
Singapore stock exchange to preserve its listing standards that exclude companies with nonvoting
stock. See Council of Institutional Investors, Letter to the Singapore Stock Exchange (March 29, 2017),
available
at:
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2017/03_29_17_letter_to_SGX.pdf.
10
See,
e.g.,
Investor
Group
Urges
Blue
Apron
to
Ditch
No-Vote
Shares,
http://www.cii.org/062117_blue_apron.
11 See, e.g., Madison Marriage, State Street Asks SEC To Ban Nonvoting Shares, FIN. T. (June 17, 2017),
available at: https://www.ft.com/content/9595e5c4-51db-11e7-bfb8-997009366969; Michael Greene,
Snap IPO Gets Investors Fired Up Over Dual-Class Stock, Bloomberg News (March 9, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/snap-ipo-gets-n57982084963/.
12 Brian Shea, SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee Airs Concerns Over Multi-Tiered Offerings Following Snap’s
IPO, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (May 9, 2017),
available at: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/09/secs-investor-advisory-committee-airsconcerns-over-multi-tiered-offerings-following-snaps-ipo/#5.
13 Specifically, the index provider announced that it would bar companies from inclusion unless at
least 5% of the voting rights are in the hands of public shareholders. FTSE Russell Voting Rights
Consultation
–
Next
Steps
(July
2017),
available
at:
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Next_Step
s.pdf,
14 S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rights (July 31, 2017) (press
release),
available
at:
https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spiceassets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulticlasssharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf?force_download=true. Existing multiple-class
companies, such as Alphabet and Facebook, will remain in the S&P 500. But Snap, which never made
it into the index, will be excluded. Id.
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deterrent to other companies planning to issue nonvoting stock in their public
offerings. That is because index funds, which make up a significant percentage of
demand for company shares,15 will not buy stock that is not included on an index. As
such, these policy changes impose a high financial penalty on dual-class companies
that will likely deter companies from utilizing such a structure in the future.16
Hostility to dual-class companies, however, is not new. Indeed, academics and
regulators have debated whether to restrict or otherwise regulate the use of dual-class
structures for at least a century.17 Yet even after so many years, the arguments on
both sides remain the same. Critics of dual-class structures argue that issuing lowvoting or nonvoting shares increases agency costs and results in sub-optimal
decision-making.18 That is because the corporate insiders retain voting control even
as their equity stake falls below fifty percent.19 Because of this wedge between their
financial interest and control, the insiders’ incentives to slack or otherwise misbehave
are heightened, while outside investors who bear the brunt of the consequences have
limited options to exercise influence.20 A newer version of this critique emphasizes
that dual-class structures allow the founding group to maintain control into
perpetuity, even after it becomes clear that the structure is no longer efficient.21
By contrast, proponents of dual-class structures have consistently claimed that
nonvoting or low-voting stock has valuable uses. Most importantly, they contend
that dual-class structures allow those who control the company—whether it be the
family in a family-owned business or the visionary founders of a successful
technology company—to retain control without having to bear excessive risk.22
See, e.g., Tom McGinty, Sarah Krouse & Elliot Bentley, Index Funds Are Taking Over The S&P 500,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016), available at: http://www.wsj.com/graphics/index-funds-taking-over-sp500/. Snap’s shares sunk to an all-time low two days after the S&P announced that it would exclude
Snap from its indices. Anita Balakrishnan, Snap Shares Set New All-Time Low As Investor Concerns Pile Up,
CNBC TECH (Aug. 2, 2017), available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/02/snapchat-snap-stockdown-to-all-time-low-amid-instagram-engagement-ipo-lockup.html.
16 See Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986).
17 See Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 896-97 (1994).
18 See Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights, CONCENTRATED
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 298- 99 (2000); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 73 (1991).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Lucian Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 101 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
22 If founders could not issue nonvoting or low-voting shares, they would often be forced to hold all
or most of their wealth in the company to maintain control, which would subject them to substantial
risk. It might also cause them to forego attractive investment opportunities because the new financing
would dilute their voting control, or push them to choose debt rather than equity financing even
when debt financing would be less beneficial. By issuing nonvoting stock, however, the founders can
secure new capital without diluting the founders’ stake. This allows founders to diversify their private
wealth, as well as secure outside financing, without losing control of the company. See Ashton, supra n.
[] at 870 (“Since the vote attached to the share under such a regulatory framework is not restricted in
terms of exchangeability, the ultimate destination of the rights attached to the vote will be determined
by the initial arrangements made between the parties when the stock is first offered publicly, and then
15
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Although dual-class structures may lead to increased agency costs—investors will
have to monitor management more closely, and when problems emerge, they will
have limited recourse—the benefits of encouraging controlled companies to access
capital markets, and of protecting the company from the influence of shareholders
with short-term interests, exceed the costs.23 Moreover, these proponents further
claim that pressure from capital markets will discourage founders from using dualclass structures when the costs exceed the benefits.24
This paper posits that these arguments for and against dual-class structures
ignore the fact that the world has changed dramatically in the past fifty years.
Beginning in the 1970s, the shareholder base of U.S. public companies has
consolidated in the hands of large institutional investors.25 And in this new world of
concentrated institutional investor ownership, nonvoting stock has a previously
unrecognized but valuable function. Specifically, this paper is the first to demonstrate
how corporate issuance of nonvoting shares, instead of increasing management
agency costs in all cases, can actually be used to lessen agency and transaction costs.
And this theoretical observation may partially explain why nonvoting stock has
surged in popularity in the past few years: a company that offers nonvoting shares to
the public can lower its cost of capital in certain cases, not because the structure
protects the founding group from interference, but because it reduces inefficiencies
associated with voting.
Not all shareholders value their votes equally. Some, including retail
shareholders, value their vote so little that they rarely exercise it.26 Others, such as
hedge fund activists, accumulate shares with the purpose of using their voting power
to agitate for changes that would increase the value of their investment. And yet, the
later upon exchanges between existing shareholders, in which the right to vote shifts to those who
value it most. Those who value voting rights the most are typically families or controlling shareholder
groups. Such groups may eventually bargain with other shareholders in order to make an exchange in
which capital is raised without diluting their present control positions.”).
23 See Bernard Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual Class Structures in
IPOs
at
15
(July
16,
2017),
available
at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986164. Of course, companies also have the
option to finance using debt, but this paper focuses on equity offerings, and takes the company’s level
of debt as given.
In defending dual class structures, Sharfman contends that although dual class companies
increase agency costs, those costs are not the only costs that need to be minimized when a company
goes public. Instead, as Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire have observed, companies and investors
seek to minimize total control costs, which include “principal costs,” or the costs that accompany
investor control. Id. (citing Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017)). This paper takes Sharfman’s observation one
step further and shows that dual class shares can be used by management to entice informed investors
to buy voting stock, thus reducing agency costs; put differently, the tradeoff between minimizing agency
costs and minimizing principal costs may not always exist when companies issue nonvoting stock.
24 See Sharfman, supra n. [].
25 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 887 (2013).
26
See Mary Ann Cloyd, 2014 Proxy Season Mid-Year Review (July 17, 2014), available
at: http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/07/17/2014-proxy-season-mid-year-review/ (finding
that, in 2014, institutional shareholders voted 90% of their shares but retail shareholders voted just
29% of their shares).
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law generally prohibits shareholders from severing their voting rights from their right
to receive corporate cash flows. This means that rationally apathetic investors must
either incur costs associated with voting or let their rights go unused, which dilutes
the influence of other investors’ votes. In a better world, shareholders who did not
value their votes could sell them to shareholders who do (controlling for
gamesmanship by wealthy shareholders with idiosyncratic interests),27 but the law
generally prohibits shareholders from selling their votes independent of their
shares.28 This means that voting rights are rarely optimally distributed across
shareholders, which leads to inefficiencies that depress the total value of the
company.
This paper argues that nonvoting shares can be used to distribute voting rights to
shareholders who value them most, allowing companies and investors to unlock the
same efficiency gains that would result if votes could be traded on a market.
Specifically, nonvoting shares can be used to allocate voting power to informed
investors who value their voting rights and are motivated to use them to maximize
the firm’s value. For that reason, the presence of nonvoting shares may entice
informed investors—think Warren Buffett—to invest in the company because they
will get more influence for less.
Likewise, funneling nonvoting shares to uninformed and “weakly motivated”
shareholders will make all shareholders better off. At the outset, it is important to
emphasize the incentive problems that cause weakly motivated shareholders to not
value their right to vote in corporate elections. These shareholders—whether they be
retail shareholders or passively managed mutual funds (“passive funds”)—prefer to
free ride off of other investors because of acute collective action problems that make
it irrational for them to invest in learning about the company and the matters at issue
at shareholder elections.29
Take the example of passive funds. Passive funds, which include index funds
and exchange traded funds (“ETFs”), often qualify as weakly motivated voters
because of their investment strategy: they seek only to replicate the performance of a
For discussions of voting markets, see Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient
Corporate Governance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 251 (2014); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 111, 123-24 (2000); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 852-54 (2006).
28 See Commonwealth Assocs. v. Providence Health Care, Inc., 641 A.2d 155, 158 (Del. Ch. 1993) (expressing
doubt that, “in a post record-date sale of corporate stock, a negotiated provision in which a beneficial
owner/seller specifically retained the ‘dangling’ right to vote as of the record date, would be a legal,
valid and enforceable provision, unless the seller maintained an interest sufficient to support the
granting of an irrevocable proxy with respect to the shares”). Developments in financial instruments,
however, have made it possible for investors to decouple economic ownership of shares and voting
rights. See Henry Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying, supra n. []. In other words, it is possible
for investors to use financial instruments to “buy” votes without increasing their economic ownership
of a company. This decoupling could allow votes to move to better informed hands and therefore
enhance the effectiveness of shareholder oversight. See id. But “empty voting” can also harm the
company when an investor with a neutral or negative financial interest in the company nonetheless
controls the outcome of a shareholder vote. See id. at 821.
29 See Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, __ J. OF CORP. L.___
(forthcoming 2018).
27
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market index, not outperform it. For this reason, these funds will not benefit from
incurring expenditures to monitor and improve the performance of the companies in
their large portfolios. In fact, any investment in stewardship or voting is guaranteed
to harm a passive fund’s relative performance—all rival funds will benefit from the
investment, while only the activist fund will bear the costs.30 And because passive
fund investors are particularly fee sensitive, any increase in fees will drive investors to
rival funds.31
Because of collective action problems, we expect that passive funds and retail
shareholders would only rarely vote in shareholder elections. And when they do vote,
their lack of information, coupled with pro-management biases and other conflicts
of interest, make it unlikely that their vote will be value-enhancing for the company.32
And yet, when a company has only a single class of shares, informed
shareholders who highly value their right to vote end up with the same investment as
weakly motivated voters, who do not. Therefore, weakly motivated voters impose a
deadweight loss on corporate governance in three main ways. First and most
important, agency costs increase when weakly motivated voters dilute the voice of
the informed voters because it will be more costly and difficult for informed voters
to discipline management. Second, the company experiences higher transaction costs
when it must manage voting for a larger group. And third, when the weakly
motivated voters have a large enough segment of the voting power and choose to
exercise it,33 the risk that they will move the company in the wrong direction
increases.
Issuing nonvoting stock can enable a company to avoid these costs and therefore
minimize the firm’s cost of capital. By issuing two classes of stock—one with voting
rights, one without34—a company can reduce agency costs by making management
more accountable to its informed investors while minimizing the transaction costs
associated with voting. In this way, nonvoting stock can function as a bonding
Id.
Id.
32 Id.
33 Although retail shareholders do not vote very often, passive funds do, either out of a mistaken
sense of their fiduciary obligations to investors, or to benefit their other investments. See id. And the
rapid growth of passive investment vehicles means that their influence is growing quickly. Already,
some S&P 500 companies have passive fund ownership in excess of 20%. In addition, the growth of
passive investing has given the institutional investors that dominate the passive fund market a
substantial voice in corporate governance: together, Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street Global
Advisers, whose portfolios primarily consist of passive funds, constitute the largest shareholder of
88% of major U.S. companies. See id.; Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, & E. Glen Weyl, A
Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L. J. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 7).
34 Although this paper focuses on nonvoting stock, low-voting stock can also be used to promote
efficient corporate governance. However, there are a few reasons to believe that nonvoting stock is
actually a superior tool. Most important, low-voting stock does not always trade at a discount to
voting stock, meaning that it is less likely that beneficial sorting will occur between informed and
uninformed voters. See Price Differentials Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, Stout Advisory Services,
available at: https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/price-differentials-between-voting-andnonvoting-stock.
30
31
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mechanism by signaling to potential investors that management would be especially
attuned to the interests of its informed voting shareholders. The strategy is simply to
channel uninformed investors to nonvoting stock.
And happily, market forces will accomplish much of this channeling because
nonvoting stock generally trades at a discount to voting stock, despite having the
same rights to dividends and cash flows.35 Therefore, weakly motivated voters who
by definition do not value their vote should gravitate toward the discounted stock.
Likewise, informed investors will generally pay a premium to buy the voting stock,
especially because the informed investors will be able to acquire influence more
cheaply without weakly motivated voters diluting the votes. From an agency cost
perspective, therefore, management can be understood as attracting capital at low
cost with this capital structure, which will entice informed outside investors to
purchase voting shares.
There are, of course, complications. Not all weakly motivated voters will
gravitate toward nonvoting stock—some may prefer voting stock for its option
value, anticipating a future takeover or the risk of disparate treatment. In addition,
some weakly motivated passive funds may purchase voting stock because their
indexing strategy requires them to do so. But even minimal dilution of weakly
motivated shareholder voting power should improve the value of the firm by
reducing agency and transaction costs; in other words, imperfect channeling is better
than none at all.
Another complication is that the effect of issuing nonvoting stock has generally
been to keep voting control with company insiders, rather than empower outside
investors. However, experimentation in dual-class company structuring has only just
begun; fifteen years ago, only family-owned companies dared to offer low-voting
stock, and nonvoting stock was even more rare. And over time, the growing
concentration of wealth, and thus, voting power, in passive funds should increase the
attractiveness of company structures that concentrate voting power with informed
investors.
The insights developed in this paper have important implications for policy
issues currently facing regulators, stock exchanges, and stock indices. First, this
analysis indicates that proposals to restrict or deter companies from issuing
nonvoting stock should be rejected. As discussed, nonvoting stock can be used to
lower a company’s cost of capital. Restricting such companies from issuing
nonvoting stock will therefore increase costs, worsen performance, and lead to
declining competitiveness. And these costs will only increase as investors continue to
flock to passive investment vehicles.36

See id.
See, e.g. Tom McGinty, Sarah Krouse, & Elliot Bentley, Index Funds are Taking Over the S&P 500,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016); Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, Wall St. J. (Aug. 26, 2016);
John Authers & Chris Newlands, Exchange Traded Funds: Taking Over the Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6.
2016).
35
36
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A second implication of this analysis is that if the law were to take a stand against
companies who issue nonvoting shares, a better approach would be to restrict
companies from issuing only nonvoting stock to the public. That is so despite the fact
that such structures, such as Snap’s, may be efficient at the time of the offering. It
may be that initially, the benefits of allowing the founders to run the company
without shareholder interference exceeded the costs. But over time, the prospect for
agency costs and other inefficiencies increases because the benefits of the dual-class
structure likely recede over time.37 Moreover, most dual-class structures enable the
controllers to continue to reduce their equity ownership without relinquishing
control.38 This further worsens the controllers’ incentives to maximize shareholder
value. And yet, without votes, the outside shareholders will lack important legal
mechanisms to influence the direction of the company, such as the right to nominate
directors or vote against them. In addition, the company’s outside shareholders will
lack information about what the company’s insiders are doing. Therefore, regulators
and stock indices could perhaps make investors (and regulators who must monitor
companies who disclose less information) better off by prohibiting companies from
offering only nonvoting shares to the public.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief history of the use and
regulation of dual-class company structures. It shows that the surge in dual-class
companies corresponds with a major change in the shareholder landscape: the rise of
institutional ownership and influence. Part III offers an overview of both sides of the
debate over dual-class structures and demonstrates that they have ignored important
benefits that nonvoting shares provide, specifically, that nonvoting shares can be
used to lessen a corporation’s agency costs, transaction costs, and reduce the
likelihood of misguided corporate changes. It posits that, so long as both classes of
stock are available to the public, beneficial sorting should occur: weakly motivated
voters will have an incentive to buy discounted nonvoting stock and informed voters
will be willing to pay a premium for the right to influence the direction of the
company. Part IV discusses implications for law. Part V concludes.
II.

BACKGROUND ON DUAL-CLASS SHARES

Academics and regulators have debated whether and how to regulate dual-class
shares for the past hundred years. In the sections that follow, I briefly map the
history of dual-class companies and attempts at regulation.39 I then discuss the
current controversy over nonvoting shares and proposals to restrict or deter
companies from offering them to the public.

See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note [].
Id.
39 The paper focuses on dual class structures in the United States, although such structures are more
common in other parts of the world. For instance, in European countries where family-owned
businesses are prevalent, such as France and Italy, the dual class structure is very common. See Kate
Bentel & Gabriel Walter, Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (2016), available at:
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/fisch_2016/217. Some countries take a more restrictive approach,
requiring that corporate structures follow the one-share-one-vote system, including Russia, India, and
South Korea. Id.
37
38
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A. A Brief History of Dual-class Company Regulation
Dual-class companies depart from the “one-share, one-vote” rule by issuing
different classes of common shares with unequal voting right, but equal or similar
entitlements to earnings.40 Although one-share, one-vote is the default under state
corporate law, it has never been mandatory.41 In fact, in the mid-1800s, before the
adoption of general incorporation statutes, the common law rule was that
corporations would follow a system of per capita voting, which required one vote
per person.42 Eventually, the common law rule became irrelevant as state legislatures
took control over corporate charters. These legislative charters varied: some
embraced one-share-one-vote, others limited the voting rights of large shareholders,
such as by capping the number of votes that any one shareholder could cast.43
But by the 1900s, in the face of evidence that mandatory limits on a
shareholder’s ability to accumulate voting power made it difficult for companies to
attract capital, states began to converge on a one-share, one-vote default.44 This left
corporations free to deviate from the statutory standard, and many did.45 However,
the growing prevalence of dual-class companies led to opposition from the public, as
well as prominent academics.46 The stock exchanges also took notice, and in 1926,
the NYSE refused to list a company that issued nonvoting stock for the first time.47

Companies with dual class shares have different classes of common shares with unequal voting
rights but equal or similar entitlements to earnings. Typically in the United States, high vote shares
have ten times the votes as low vote shares, but other structures are possible, such as when the high
vote class elects the majority of the board and the low vote class elects a minority of the board.
41 See Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC’s Authority Over Shareholder Voting Rights, UCLA School of
Law
Research
Paper
No.
07-16,
available
at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985707; Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8 § 151
(authorizing a corporation to have different classes of stock with such rights, powers, and preferences
as may be set forth in the certificate of incorporation or the board, if the certificate gives the board
that power).
42 Ashton, supra note [] at 890.
43 Bainbridge, SEC’s Authority, supra note [] at 4.
44 Id. at 5.
45 A variety of reasons have been noted for the preference for nonvoting stock during those years,
including “(1) the investor-speculator's dual demand for a share in the huge profits earned by industry
during the period and the appearance of security greater than that offered by the common share; (2)
the desire of management to raise additional capital when it was easy to do so while retaining full
control of the corporation; and (3) a vaguely felt or implied desire on the part of bankers and
investors to have something new.” Jeffirey Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting
Common Shares-Their History, Legality, and Validity, 15 SEC. REG. L. J. 37, 47-50 (1987). And as the use of
nonvoting stock became increasingly prevalent, courts generally acquiesced to its use on the basis of
freedom to contract. See Ashton, supra n. [] at 892 (collecting cases).
46 William Ripley, a professor of political economics at Harvard, was the most prominent proponent
of equal voting rights and wrote many articles and speeches designed to stop transactions that
“disenfranchised” shareholders. His efforts eventually attracted the attention of President Coolidge.
The public, too, grew increasingly hostile toward the use of nonvoting stock, especially after a sale by
Dillon, Reed, & Company of Dodge Brothers debentures that enabled Dillon, Reed to retain voting
control of the company for itself. Id. at 892.
47 Bebchuk and Kastiel, supra n. [] at 9; see also Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights:
The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 693–707 (1986).
Nonetheless, dual class structures remained popular—in the years between 1927 and 1932, at least
40
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This ad hoc decisionmaking materialized into a formal rule by 1940, when the NYSE
adopted a listing requirement that excluded dual-class companies from the
exchange.48 This policy remained for six decades, until General Motors was
permitted to issue restricted shares in conjunction with its acquisition of Electronic
Data Systems Corporation in 1984.49
Around the same time, the NYSE designated a subcommittee to recommend a
policy regarding dual-class listings.50 The result was a policy proposal requiring twothirds of shareholders to approve the creation of a second class of stock, in addition
to approval by a majority of independent directors, the maintenance of a 10:1 ratio
of voting rights between the enhanced shares and the second class of shares, and a
requirement that all other rights between the shares be substantially the same.51 If
these conditions were met, the NYSE would list the shares.
This new policy, as well as a resurgence in the use of dual-class offerings brought
on by the 1980s takeover wave, triggered new scrutiny by the SEC.52 In 1988, the
SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4, which restricted the NYSE, the AMEX, and
NASDAQ from listing or continuing to list companies that departed from the oneshare, one-vote default unless certain circumstances were met.53 Specifically, the rule
permitted issuers to offer new classes of nonvoting stock, or a special class with
limited voting rights, provided the issuance did not dilute the voting power of
existing shareholders.54 Rule 19c-4 also permitted the issuance of a second class of
stock in the context of a merger or acquisition with a bona fide business purpose.55
The SEC asserted that it had the authority to adopt the rule based on Securities
Exchange Act § 19(c), which permits the agency to amend exchange rules provided
that the action furthers the Act’s purposes. The SEC contended that § 14(a) of the
Act embodied the purpose of protecting corporate democracy.56 The D.C. Circuit
disagreed, ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC that § 14(a) did not give the SEC power
to regulate substantive aspects of shareholder voting, but only to regulate the

288 corporations issued non-voting or limited voting rights shares (which was almost half of the total
number of such issuances). Bainbridge, SEC’s Authority, supra note [] at 7.
48 Ashton, supra note [] at 893.
49 Id. at 893-94. It appears that increased takeover activity may have prompted the stock exchange’s
decision to reconsider the policy. That, and the fact that an increasing number of family-run
companies wished to access the public equity markets where share values were at record highs. Dual
class structures were the only means of gaining access without diluting their control. Id. For these
reasons, competitor stock exchanges with less restrictive dual class listing standards were attracting
corporate listings and diluting the NYSE’s market share.
50 See Seligman, supra note [], at 701-06.
51 See NYSE’s Proposed Rule Changes on Disparate Voting Rights, 18 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1389
(Sept. 19, 1986).
52 Bebchuk and Kastiel, supra note [] at 10.
53 Bainbridge, SEC Authority, supra note [] at 8.
54 Ashton, supra note [], at 899.
55 Id.
56 Bainbridge, SEC Authority, supra note [] at 8.
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procedures by which proxy solicitations are conducted, as well as proxy voting
disclosure.57
Therefore, after 1990, companies were largely free to depart from the one-share,
one-vote rule.58 But before 2004, companies rarely chose to do so, with certain
notable exceptions, including the New York Times and News Corp.,59 which
contended that the dual-class structure helped protect journalistic integrity;60 closely
held companies such as Berkshire Hathaway; and family-owned companies such as
Ford.61
In 2004, Google became the first technology company to adopt a dual-class
structure for the explicit purpose of keeping control of the company in the hands of
the founding group.62 To accomplish that purpose, only the low-vote shares (which
had 1/10th of the voting power as the Class B shares held by the insiders) were sold
to the public. In a letter to the public, the founders explained, “After the IPO,
Sergey, Eric and I will control 37.6% of the voting power of Google, and the
executive management team and directors as a group will control 61.4% of the
voting power. New investors will fully share in Google’s long term economic future
but will have little ability to influence its strategic decisions through their voting
rights.”63
Since 2004, other technology companies have followed suit, either going public
with dual-class structures, or engaging in stock splits to help founders maintain
control. For example, in 2012, Facebook went public offering only Class A shares
with a single vote per share to the public, in contrast with the Class B shares, which
had ten votes and were owned exclusively by Facebook insiders. After the IPO,
Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, held over 50% of the voting power of the
company despite owning less than 10% of the economic value. “This concentrated
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. 1990).
The NYSE and other major U.S. stock exchanges prohibit recapitalizations that reduce the voting
rights of existing shareholders. Thus, companies that wish to remain listed are permitted issue new
classes of low or nonvoting stock but they are not able to reduce the voting rights of existing stock.
See Stephen Bainbridge, Revisiting the One Share/One Vote Controversy: The Exchanges’ Uniform Voting
Rights Policy, 22 SEC. REG. L. J. 175, 176 (1994).
59 Ironically, News Corp. is the parent company of Dow Jones, the index publisher that has refused to
list dual class companies.
60 Landon Thomas, Jr., Morgan Stanley Criticizes Stock Structure of Times Co., N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 6, 20160,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/business/04times.html (explaining that the
structure of the New York Times Company has been in place since before the company went public
in 1969 and was intended to protect the newsroom from interference). The newspaper companies
usually allow the public shareholders to elect a minority of the board seats (4 in the case of the New
York Times), while the insiders elect the remaining 9. Id.
61 See Edward Kamonjoh, Investor Responsibility Research Ctr. Inst., Controlled Companies in the
Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Follow-up Review of Performance & Risk 84–87 (Mar. 2016),
https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Controlled-Companies-IRRCI-2015-FINAL3-16-16.pdf (listing companies with dual class structures).
62 This paper refers to Google, although the company is now technically Alphabet Inc., after a 2015
corporate reorganization.
63
See Alphabet Investor Relations, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, available at:
https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html
57
58
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control,” the company wrote in the S-1, “will limit [the investors’] ability to influence
corporate matters for the foreseeable future.”64
More recently, in April 2016, Facebook announced that it would engage in a 3-1
stock split by issuing two Class C shares with zero voting rights for every share of
Class A and B stock.65 Unsurprisingly, shareholders ratified the plan at the company’s
annual meeting on June 20, 2016, but the board stalled in issuing the stock because
of pending litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Two groups of
shareholders had filed complaints alleging that the stock split was an attempt to
entrench Zuckerberg, who only last year announced that he planned to give away
99% of his wealth, most of which is Facebook equity.66 In September 2017,
Facebook announced that it would abandon the stock reclassification plan, mooting
the litigation.67
Google, too, faced shareholder litigation after it engaged in a stock split in 2012.
Rather than simply doubling the number of shares outstanding as is traditionally
done in stock splits, Google took the opportunity to create a new class of nonvoting
shares.68 By distributing a Class C share for every outstanding Class A and Class B
share, the split allowed the founders to maintain their voting control, while creating
additional equity to use for compensation and acquisition purposes. Some of
Google’s large institutional investors objected to the arrangement and sued Google
in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The litigation eventually settled and the split
went forward, but Google agreed in the settlement that if the Class C shares traded
at a discount greater than 1% of the Class A shares at the end of the first year, the
shareholders were entitled to compensation.69 By the end of the year, the shares were
trading at a discount of 1.4%, requiring Google to pay out more than $500 million to
the Class C shareholders.70
The prospect of litigation has not deterred other technology companies from
utilizing dual-class structures. Since 2004, several prominent tech companies,
including Groupon, LinkedIn, Yelp, and Zynga, have gone public issuing only lowFacebook, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement (Feb. 1, 2012), available at:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm
65 See Charles Kane, What Facebook’s Latest Stock Move Means for Investors and the SEC, FORTUNE (May 7,
2016), available at: http://fortune.com/2016/05/07/facebook-stock-mark-zuckerberg-sec/.
66 See Class Action Complaint, McGinty v. Zuckerberg, Delaware Court of Chancery, available at:
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/Facebook_complaints/facebookmcginty.pdf; Class Action
Complaint,
Levy
v.
Zuckerberg,
available
at:
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/Facebook_complaints/facebookcomplaintericlevy.pdf. That
litigation is still pending before the Court of Chancery.
67
Facebook,
Inc.
Form
8-K
(Sept.
22,
2017),
available
at:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000042/form8k_92217.htm.
68 See Stephen Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2013), available at: https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-givesgoogle-founders-tighter-control/
69 See Google, Inc., Current Report on Form 8-K (filed Oct. 30, 2013) (reporting that the Delaware
Court of Chancery approved the settlement entered into by the company, its board of directors and
the plaintiffs in the class action captioned In Re: Google Inc. Class C Shareholder Litigation, Civil
Action No. 7469-CS).
70 Id.
64

12

voting stock to the public.71 Other companies, such as Under Armour and Zillow,
engaged in stock splits and issued nonvoting stock as a tool to prevent the founding
group’s control from being diminished in the future.72
Despite the increasing popularity of nonvoting stock in stock splits, no company
had been willing to offer only nonvoting stock to the public in an IPO.73 But in
March, Snap did just that. The company utilized a three-tiered structure, reserving its
two classes of voting stock for company insiders, with the super-voting stock
remaining with the company’s two young co-founders. As a result of this structure,
the founders hold 88.5% of the company’s voting power, but only 18.7% of the
outstanding equity.74
When Snap announced its plans, many wondered why investors would invest in a
company with such an unfriendly governance structure.75 And yet, Snap closed its
first day of trading up 44% from its IPO price.76 In other words, investors, including
the large institutional investors who vocally opposed the nonvoting dual-class
structure, were not deterred from purchasing shares.
Although no other company has followed Snap’s example, other companies
utilized nonvoting stock in their public offerings in the months that followed. Since
Snap’s IPO, two companies—Blue Apron and Altice—have utilized a triple-class
structure, authorizing single-vote Class A shares for the public, super-voting class B
shares for insiders, and a reserve of Class C shares with no voting rights that could
be issued in the future.77

See Bebchuk and Kastiel, supra n. [] at 8 (reporting that since 2004, Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn,
Trip Advisor, and Zynga all adopted a dual class structure in their public offerings).
72 See Angela Chen, Zillow Approves Dividend, Creates C Class of Stock, WALL. ST. J. (July 21, 2016,
available
at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/zillow-approves-dividend-creates-c-class-of-stock1437512241; Miriam Gottfried, A Double-Digit Return is Hiding in Plain Sight at Under Armour, Wall St. J.
(Nov. 28, 2016). Under Armour was sued by its shareholders following the split and eventually settled
claims that the board of directors breached its fiduciary duties in approving the issuance of nonvoting Class C shares through a stock split of current Class A shareholders’ shares and amending the
company’s charter. The judicially approved settlement order awarded a $59 million dividend to Class
C shareholders, designed to account for losses as a result of the split. See In re: Under Armour
Shareholder Litigation, Case No. 24-C-15-003240 (Circuit Court, Baltimore County MD); Under
Armour
Form
10-K
(Feb.
19,
2016),
available
at:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000133691716000064/ua20151231x10k.htm#sB757DF0B726DA0FE59E7C4E24B684F99
73 See Snap Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement 4 (Feb. 16, 2017) (“To our
knowledge, no other company has completed an initial public offering of non-voting stock on a U.S.
stock exchange.”).
74 Id. This control only goes away when both die or if they sell off 70% of their super-voting shares.
Moreover, if one of the founders were to die, a proxy arrangement specifies that voting control would
transfer to the other.
75 See supra, n. [].
76 Maureen Farrell, Corrie Driebusch and Sarah Krouse, Snapchat Shares Surge 44% in Market Debut,
WALL ST. J. (March 2, 2017).
77 See Tom Zanki, More Companies Authorizing Dual Class Shares Despite Resistance, Law360 (July 12,
2017), available at: https://www.law360.com/capitalmarkets/articles/943458.
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B. Recent Calls for Reform
The surge in dual-class stock listings in the United States has generated heated
opposition from institutional investors, lawmakers, and investor advocacy groups.
Their concerns are reminiscent of complaints levied at the start of the 20th century:
these critics argue that creating a wedge between an investor’s economic interest the
company and voting power not only decreases the controller’s incentives to
maximize the share price, but also reduces her accountability to the majority
shareholders.78
In light of the SEC’s limited ability to regulate dual-class listings following
Business Roundtable, these critics have directed advocacy efforts to the stock indices.
Most vocally, CII, an organization of more than 140 public, union, and corporate
pension funds, has petitioned the U.S. indices—the S&P Dow Jones Indices, MSCI
Inc., and FTSE Russell—to adopt a one-share, one-vote policy since 2012.79 Under
their proposed policy, the indices would bar companies with nonvoting stock unless
they incorporate sunset provisions that would terminate the dual-class structure
The empirical evidence on this subject is mixed. Compare Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance:
An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. Stud. 1051, 1051–54 (2010) (founding
evidence that U.S. dual class companies exhibited increased agency costs and reduced value from 1995
to 2002); with Ronald C. Anderson et al., The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair (Aug. 14, 2017). Fox
School of Business Research Paper No. 17-021, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006669
(finding that dual class structures yield excess stock returns of nearly 350 basis points per year,
suggesting that on average, these structures do not harm outside investors); Valentin Dimitrov &
Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock
Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342, 346–47 (2006) (suggesting that dual class structures might have some
positive effects); and Scott W. Bauguess et al., Large Shareholder Diversification, Corporate Risk Taking, and
the Benefits of Changing to Differential Voting Rights, 36 J. Banking & Fin. 1244, 1244–46 (2012) (same).
Indeed, a recent empirical study commissioned by CII concluded only that dual-class companies did
feature a meaningful increase in long term value relative to their single-class company peers. See
Gabriel Morey, Multi-Class Stock and Firm Value (May 2017), available at:
http://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/05_10_17_dual-class_value_summary.pdf.
Cf.
R.C.
Anderson, Founding family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500, J. OF FIN. 58, 1301–
1327 (2003) (concluding that family-owned firms performed better than firms that were not family
owned). For an extensive survey of the empirical evidence evaluating dual class structures, see Renée
Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51 (2008).
79 See Letter from the Council of Institutional Investors to NASDAQ (Oct. 2, 2012), available at:
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/10_02_12_cii_letter_to_nasda
q_dual_class_stock.pdf; Letter from the Council of Institutional Investors to NYSE (Oct. 2, 2014),
available
at:
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/10_02_12_cii_letter_to_nasda
q_dual_class_stock.pdf. Ironically, many of the companies that create these indexes are CII members.
See
Council
of
Institutional
Investors,
General
Members,
available
at:
http://www.cii.org/general_members.
CII’s advocacy is not confined to those IPOs with dual-class shares listed on the U.S. stock
indexes. It also is attempting to persuade the Singapore, Hong Kong, and London stock
exchanges not to allow dual-class share structures of any kind. See Council of Institutional Investors,
Dual Class Stock, available at: http://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock (collecting letters).
Notwithstanding these lobbying efforts, Hong Kong’s stock exchange recently reversed a longstanding policy excluding dual class companies in an attempt to attract technology company listings.
See Benjamin Robertson, Hong Kong Targets Next Alibaba in Revamp of IPO Rules, Bloomberg Markets
(Dec. 15, 2017), available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-15/hong-kongmoves-toward-dual-class-shares-wooing-next-alibaba.
78
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within three to five years of the issuance.80 This policy, if implemented, would be a
strong deterrent for any company considering whether to issue nonvoting shares
because being listed on an index creates substantial demand for the company’s
equity.81
CII’s advocacy is not limited to major stock indices—it has also written open
letters to companies, including Snap and Blue Apron, asking them to abandon their
dual-class IPOs or convert all dual-class structures unless the low-voting share class
votes to extend it.82 CII has also made its case to the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Investor Advisory Committee, which held a meeting on March 9,
2017 centering on Snap’s multi-class structure.83
Large and influential investors have also expressed opposition to dual-class
structures.84 For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“CalPERS”), the largest U.S. pension fund, has threatened to boycott any dual-class
listing that allows a minority of shareholders to control a majority of the votes.85 The
Investor Stewardship Group, a collective of some of the largest U.S. institutional
investors, including BlackRock, Vanguard Group, T. Rowe Price, and State Street
Global Advisors, have taken a position against dual-class companies in their January
2017 stewardship code. That code, called the Framework for Promoting Long-Term
Value Creation for U.S. Companies, states as a core corporate governance principle
that “shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their
economic interest.”86 Separately, T. Rowe Price, a large asset management firm, has
threatened to vote against directors at dual-class companies unless they take action to
reclassify the shares.87

Id.
See, e.g., Tom McGinty, Sarah Krouse, & Elliot Bentley, Index Funds Are Taking Over The S&P 500,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016), available at: http://www.wsj.com/graphics/index-funds-taking-over-sp500/.
82 Id.
83 In that meeting, a representative of CII, as well as certain institutional investors, urged the SEC to
use its regulatory authority over the exchanges to limit the ability of companies to have dual class
structures. Kurt Schacht, the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investor Advisory
Committee, agreed, describing Snap’s structure as “a significant concern” and a “troubling
development from the perspective of investor protection and corporate governance” if it were to spur
a new trend for tech companies going. See David Berger, Dual Class Stock and Private Ordering: A System
That Works, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
available at: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-private-ordering-asystem-that-works/https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/09/secs-investor-advisory-committeeairs-concerns-over-multi-tiered-offerings-following-snaps-ipo/
84 See Bebchuk and Kastiel, supra n. [].
85 Shanny Basar, CalPERS Sets Sights on Dual-Class Stock Structures, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2012),
available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443855804577601271252759472. The
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”) and the Florida State Board of
Administration (“Florida SBA”) have made similar threats. Bebchuk and Kastiel, supra n. [].
86 See Investor Stewardship Group, Corporate Governance and Stewardship Principles, Harvard Law
School Forum for Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Feb. 7, 2017), available at:
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/07/corporate-governance-and-stewardship-principles/
87 Ross Kerber, U.S. Investor Group Urges Halt to Dual-Class Structures in IPOs, REUTERS (March 23,
2016), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ipo-votingrights-idUSKCN0WP1Q0.
80
81
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Proxy advisor firms have also expressed strong opposition to dual-class
structures. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) has denounced
them as “an autocratic model of governance.”88 It has also proposed to amend its
voting policies to recommend that shareholders vote against director nominees at
companies that have completed an IPO with a dual-class capital structure unless
there is a reasonable sunset provision.89
This wave of advocacy has begun to have an effect. In July 2017, FTSE Russell
announced that it would bar companies from inclusion in its indices unless at least
5% of the voting rights were in the possession of public shareholders.90 As a result,
both Snap and Blue Apron, which went public with less than 2% of its voting rights
held by public shareholders, have been excluded from its indices.91
Just days later, S&P 500 Dow Jones announced that going forward, the S&P 500,
S&P 600, and S&P 400 indices will no longer admit companies with multiple share
class structures.92 This meant that Snap would be excluded, although existing dualclass companies, such as Facebook and Google, would be grandfathered into the
indices. Other indices are considering whether to follow suit.93
These decisions dealt a major blow to Snap and provided a powerful deterrent to
other companies considering whether to utilize nonvoting stock. That is because
index funds, which make up a significant percentage of demand for company
shares,94 will not buy stock that is not included on an index. As such, these policy
changes impose a high financial penalty on dual-class companies that is likely to
eliminate future dual-class listings in the United States.
C. Changes to the Investment Landscape
The surge in dual-class companies corresponds with a major change in the
shareholder landscape. In the past fifty years, the shareholder base has consolidated
in the hands of large institutional investors—mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., The Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons 3 (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf.
89 Lyuba Goltser, ISS Proposes New 2017 Voting Policies, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance
and
Financial
Regulation
(Nov.
2,
2016),
available
at:
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/02/iss-proposes-new-2017-voting-policies/.
90 FTSE Russell Voting Rights Consultation – Next Steps (July 2017), available at:
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Next_Step
s.pdf; see also Richard Teitelbaum, Index Firms Take Issue With Nonvoting Rights, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9,
2017), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-firms-take-issue-with-nonvoting-rights1491739227.
91 Existing index constituents were given a five-year grace period to conform their voting structure. Id.
92 S&P 500 Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on Multi-Class Shares
and Voting Rules, Press Release (July 31, 2017), available at: https://www.spiceindices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulticlasssharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf. The new policy will not affect the S&P Global
BMI Indices and S&P Total Market Index, which are intended to “represent the investment
universe.” Id.
93 See Teitelbaum, supra n. [].
94 See n. [], supra.
88
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funds. Now, more Americans own U.S. company stock than ever before, but they do
so through investment intermediaries.95 As a result, institutional investor ownership
stakes in U.S. public companies have become increasingly concentrated. For
example, twenty percent of Microsoft’s equity is in the hands of its five largest
shareholders, and more than a third is held by its twenty largest shareholders.96
But that is not all. In the past ten years, another major market change has
occurred: investors have been flocking to passive funds in droves. Between 2008 and
2015, investors sold holdings of actively managed equity mutual funds worth roughly
$800 billion, while at the same time buying approximately $1 trillion in passive
funds.97 This past year alone, investors withdrew $340 billion from actively managed
funds and invested $533 billion into passive funds, increasing the total amount of
assets invested in passive funds by 9%.98Assets under management in passive funds
now represent $4 trillion, or 34% of the U.S. mutual fund market, up from just 4%
in 1995.99 And in the past ten years, the share of total U.S. market capitalization held
by passively managed funds has quadrupled to more than 8%, or 12% of the S&P
500.100
This explosive growth is driven by a growing awareness of the benefits of passive
funds for investors: studies have generally shown that the average actively managed
mutual fund is unlikely to outperform its baseline index, despite levying much higher
fees.101 As such, the rapid growth of passive funds is predicted to continue.102
And already, the three institutional investors that dominate the market for
passive funds—Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock—have become powerful
voices in corporate governance. In 2015, together these institutions constituted the
largest owner of nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 500, which is up from
Kenneth French, Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing, 63 J. FIN. 1537 (2008). Changes in
federal retirement policy were the biggest drivers of the growth of institutional investing. See generally
Gilson and Gordon, supra note [] at 879; Rock, supra note [] at 5.
96 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. OF
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89 (2017).
97 Fichtner et al., supra note [] at 2.
98 Tergesen and Zweig, supra note [].
99 Id. at 6.
100 Gormley et al., Passive Investors, supra note [] at 49.
101 Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 55051 (2009) (“[W]hen [active managed funds’] higher costs are taken into account, the average actively
managed dollar under-performs a passively managed index of securities…This account leaves open
the possibility that some actively managed funds will beat the market…Much, however, conspires
against the average investor picking out consistently above-average performers…. Investing in an
actively managed mutual fund is betting on one horse in a very crowded field…According to one
study, over a fifteen year period, 84% of actively managed mutual funds failed to yield returns in
excess of the stock market as a whole.”).
102 Ernst & Young has forecasted annual growth rates for the ETF industry of between 15 and 30
percent in the next few years. EY Global ETF Survey: 2015 and Beyond (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-etf-survey-2015-and-beyond/$FILE/ey-etfsurvey-2015-and-beyond.pdf. Likewise, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that assets invested in
ETFs will double annually until 2020. Judith Evans and Jonathan Eley, Democratising finance: How passive
funds changed investing, FIN. T. (2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3c0c960-a56c-11e4-bf1100144feab7de.html.
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25% in 2000.103 When considering all listed companies in the U.S., together these
three institutions were the single largest shareholder at least 40% of the time.104
Scholars have questioned whether the rise of passive investing, and institutional
investing more broadly, is good for corporate governance. Some, including Einer
Elhauge, Eric Posner, Glen Weyl, and Fiona Morton, have posited that the rise of
institutional investing may lead to anticompetitive conduct because institutional
shareholders with large horizontal investments across competitor firms in
concentrated industries might induce those companies to compete less
aggressively.105 Others worry that the increase in passive investing will lead to a
power vacuum and corporate governance distortions at public companies.106 As the
next section demonstrates, nonvoting shares may play a role in ameliorating some of
these concerns.
III.

NONVOTING SHARES AND EFFICIENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The dispute over the use of nonvoting shares strikes at the heart of corporate
law’s greatest debate: whether shareholder activism should be welcomed as a
beneficial force for corporate discipline, or whether it should be viewed as a
distraction from the company’s long term goals. Because voting is an important
component of activism, discussions about dual-class shares tend to fall into one of
these camps.
Critics of nonvoting shares argue that their use increases agency costs at
corporations.107 The agency cost problem in corporate law is as follows: Shareholders
finance the company and delegate control to corporate insiders—the agents—but
doing so creates a conflict of interest between the insiders who make the decisions
and the investors who bear the consequences. When the insiders’ voting control
exceeds their equity stake in the company, the misalignment of incentives between
corporate insiders and shareholders is even more pronounced—the insiders will reap
a disproportionately small share of the gains and losses from their decisions,108 and
so they may use their voting power to maximize their private benefits, rather than
maximize the value of the company’s equity.109 This misalignment can lead to
distorted investment decisions,110 tunneling,111 and inefficient perquisite

Posner et al., supra note [] at 7.
Fichtner et al., supra note [] at 17.
105 See Posner et al., supra note []; Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267,
1291-1292 (2016).
106 See Lund, supra note []; Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra n. [].
107 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra n. []; Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. [].
108 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. [].
109 Id.; see also Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. AND ECON.,
327 (1983); Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
110 Bebchuk et al., supra note [].
111 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 22 (2000). Tunneling refers to the transfer of resources from a company to its controlling
shareholder. Id.
103
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consumption. And when this happens, the outside shareholders that are most
affected will have no recourse, aside from selling their shares.
By contrast, under a one-share-per-vote system, the corporate insiders’ incentives
are better aligned with the outside shareholders. To keep control, the insiders must
hold a controlling equity stake, meaning that they will bear a substantial fraction of
the costs and benefits of their decisionmaking.112 If they sell down their ownership
stake, the outside investors with the majority of the equity will be able to vote out
management out of office when problems arise (or sell to someone who can). This
provides an important check against bad behavior—the insiders will realize that if
they slack or self-deal, their jobs will be at risk.
In sum, economic theory embraces proportionate voting rights as an important
mechanism to help the company minimize management agency costs. Proportionate
voting also facilitates the market for corporate control—if the outside shareholders
face high coordination costs, they can sell their shares to an outside bidder, who can
use the votes to bring in new management and run the firm more efficiently.113
Proponents of dual-class stock do not dispute that nonvoting stock can increase
agency cost problems.114 Instead, they contend that providing some isolation from
shareholder intervention may be beneficial on balance because it allows management
to pursue their long term vision of the company without distraction from
shareholders with short-term incentives.115 These proponents also argue that market
pressures at the time of the offering ensure that dual-class structures will only be
utilized when they are truly value-enhancing, i.e., when the benefits from giving the
insiders freedom from interference outweighs heightened agency costs.116

Jensen & Meckling, supra n. [] at [].
Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119, 140 (1987) (contending that “the cost of dual class common stock is that the effectiveness
of the market for corporate control as a monitoring device is reduced.”); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii &
Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON 107 (2003) (finding that the
average age of companies with dual class share structures in 2001 was 12.87 years while the average
age for single-class companies was 9.60 years and positing that the explanation for this difference was
that the dual class companies could resist takeovers); see also See Stanford Grossman and Oliver Hart,
One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON., 175-202 (1988).
114 See, e.g., Bernard Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual Class Structures
in IPOs (July 26, 2017), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986164
(manuscript at 15); cf. Albert Choi, Concentrated Control and Long-Term Shareholder Value, HARV. BUS. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that the presence of controlling shareholders may enhance the
company’s long-term value by inducing commitment and investment by the controlling shareholder,
despite the risk of increased agency costs).
115 See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L. J. 560
(2016); David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and Aaron J, Benjamin, Tenure Voting and the U.S.
Public Company, 72 BUS. LAWYER (2016).
116 Sharfman, supra note [] at 18-22; Ronald Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 808—809 (1987); Jensen and Meckling, supra n. [] at [] (contending that
rational minority shareholders expect expropriation from the controllers and thus demand a lower
subscription price when the controlling shareholder turns to the capital market for new capital).
Proponents of dual class structures also contend that they encourage controllers to access
the public markets. Otherwise, the controller would be forced to remain private forever—itself an
112
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Both sides of the debate begin with the assumption that dual-class arrangements
increase agency costs. This paper departs from that view by showing that in some
cases, nonvoting stock can be used to reduce agency costs in a corporation by
allocating voting control to outside shareholders that have the best incentives to
maximize the residual value of the company. In other words, nonvoting stock can be
used to promote efficient corporate governance. The sections that follow explain
why this is the case.
A. Weakly Motivated Voters and Nonvoting Stock
In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling famously posited that there is an
optimal proportion of debt and equity for any given level of equity owned by insiders
that would minimize total agency costs.117 Along those lines, this paper posits that
there may be an optimal proportion of nonvoting and voting outside equity that
minimizes management agency costs. That is because at most corporations, some
fraction of shareholders are weakly motivated voters, or shareholders who suffer
from collective action problems that make it irrational for them to become informed
about the company or incur costs associated with stewardship. When these weakly
motivated shareholders do vote, their lack of information coupled with conflicts of
interests make it unlikely that their input will be welfare enhancing.
The quintessential weakly motivated voter is the retail shareholder, who is likely
to refrain from participating in governance because the benefits of doing so are
unlikely to exceed the costs.118 But retail shareholders make up a smaller and smaller
fraction of the shareholder base of the modern corporation. As discussed, the
majority of shares are in the hands of institutional investors—pension funds, mutual
funds, and hedge funds.119 These investors have large stakes in their portfolio
companies, which somewhat reduces their incentive to free ride.120 That is not to say
that their incentives are perfect,121 but many institutional investors have the resources
inefficient outcome—or control a high percentage of the equity, making it more difficult for the
controller to diversify. See Ashton, supra note [] at [].
117 Jensen & Meckling, supra note []. Jensen and Meckling emphasize the role of debt in facilitating
greater insider ownership of firm equity. With greater ownership, insiders care more about the firm’s
performance. But there are agency costs when debt increases arising out of the insiders’ heightened
incentives to reallocate wealth from the bondholders to themselves by increasing the value of the
equity claim through excessive risk taking. Thus, there will be an optimal ratio of outside debt and
equity for any level of internal equity that minimizes these agency costs. Id.
118 See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
119 Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 887 (2013).
120 See Lund, supra note []; Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICHIGAN L. REV. 520,
575-91 (1990).
121 Large mutual funds suffer from a new collective action problem as a result of the structure of the
industry—because funds compete on the basis of relative performance, it diminishes their incentives
to invest in improving the performance of any one firm. See Gilson, Agency Costs, supra note at 887
(discussing the collective action problem facing institutional investors). Activist hedge funds face a
different incentive problem by virtue of their short investment horizon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do
Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 458–59 (2014) (contending that empowering investors with short-term
investment horizons, such as activist hedge funds, will compromise long-term company value).
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and sophistication to exercise their vote intelligently, as well as a financial incentive
to invest in monitoring and stewardship. For this reason, this paper refers to these
institutional investors as “informed voters.”122
There are important exceptions. Most importantly, a large (and growing) subset
of institutional investors will often qualify as weakly motivated voters—passive
funds.123 Passive funds have no financial incentive to invest in voting in an informed
way because their indexing strategy requires that they match the performance of an
index.124 Indeed, informed voting would almost certaintly harm the passive fund’s
relative performance.
A passive fund’s key comparative advantage is that it does not need to hire a
team of analysts or incur the costs associated with company-specific research—this is
why the fund can charge such low fees.125 But casting an informed vote would
require the fund to expend additional resources to learn about the company and
evaluate the proposal. And because passive funds have very large portfolios, much
larger than active funds, the cost of casting an intelligent vote at each company
would have to be replicated across hundreds of companies.126 Such expenditures
would eliminate the cost savings generated by the indexing strategy and would drive
investors to rival funds.
Moreover, passive funds suffer from acute collective action problems—any
expenditure incurred to improve governance at one of the fund’s portfolio
companies will benefit all rival funds in equal measure, meaning that it is guaranteed
to harm the fund’s relative performance.
For these reasons, many passive funds and retail shareholders are likely to qualify
as weakly motivated voters: because of collective action problems, their rational
strategy is to remain uninformed about the company and free ride off other
investors. It may be possible, therefore, for a company to improve its
Finally, pension funds, whose board members are appointed by politicians or elected, are particularly
sensitive to political pressure. Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance (University
of Pennsylvania Working Paper, July 21, 2015) (manuscript at 13).
122 See also, Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (referring to “information traders,” or investors who are “willing and able
to devote resources to gathering and analyzing information as a basis for its investment decisions” and
“then trade to capture the value of their informational advantage.”).
123 The term “passive funds” includes index funds and ETFs, which are designed to automatically
track a market index. In addition, some actively managed mutual funds may qualify as “quasiindexers,” or funds with highly diversified holdings and low portfolio turnover. See German Gutierrez
& Thomas Philippon, Investment-less Growth: An Empirical Investigation, NBER Working Paper No.
22897 (Dec. 2017), available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22897. In other words, although they
bill themselves as actively managed, quasi-indexers essentially follow an indexing strategy and thus, are
unlikely to value their vote very highly.
124 See Lund, supra n. [] at [].
125 See Lund, supra n. [] at [].
126 For example, a typical S&P 500 tracker fund will have investments in 500 companies. Actively
managed mutual funds are much smaller. See David M. Smith and Hany Shawky, Optimal Number of
Stock Holdings in Mutual Fund Portfolios Based on Market Performance, 40 FIN. REV. 481, tbl.2 (showing that
in 2000, the mean number of companies in a mutual fund portfolio was 92).
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competitiveness and lower its cost of capital by issuing nonvoting shares for the
weakly motivated voters to buy. The next sections explain why doing so would
reduce management agency costs, transaction costs, and the risk of suboptimal
outcomes for the company.
i.

Agency Costs

When weakly motivated voters purchase nonvoting stock, agency costs fall. To
see why, consider the following example. Company A is a dual-class company, and
sixty percent of Company A’s stock is voting. The other forty percent is nonvoting.
The insiders at Company A hold one third of the voting stock, for a total of 20%.127
The informed outside investors hold the remainder of the voting stock, for a total of
40%, and the weakly motivated voters hold all of the nonvoting stock.
If we were to compare Company A to Company B, a company that is identical in
all respects except that has only a single class of voting stock, Company A’s equity
will be more valuable than Company B’s for a few reasons. First, Company A has
reduced its agency costs by issuing the nonvoting stock because doing so has made
the informed investors’ votes more powerful. In other words, management at
Company A knows that if it fails to act in the best interests of the shareholders, it
will face discipline in the form of shareholder proposals, no votes on executive
compensation, no votes in director elections, and even proxy contests. This provides
a powerful incentive for management to act in the shareholders’ interests. Moreover,
issuing nonvoting stock will make Company A more desirable to informed investors
ex ante, further reducing agency costs.
By contrast, at Company B, management knows that if it underperforms, it has a
layer of security in the form of the weakly motivated voters. For example, if
threatened with a proxy contest, management need only convince thirty-eight
percent of the outside shareholders—informed and weakly motivated alike—that the
company’s current rocky situation is part of the long term plan in order to prevail.128
Knowing this, management will be much less likely to change its behavior to satisfy
the informed investors that are unhappy with the direction of the company.
Likewise, an informed voter knows that if Company B’s management
underperforms, the expenses and risks associated with imposing discipline on
management will increase. And for this reason, proxy battles waged by hedge fund
activists have been increasingly expensive. For example, Nelson Peltz’s 2017 proxy
campaign against Proctor & Gamble cost his hedge fund, Trian Partners, $30
Note that in this example, the company insiders keep a minority of the voting stock, and use the
nonvoting stock to sort between informed and weakly motivated voters. This is very different than
the allocation of voting power in typical dual class companies, which issue nonvoting or low-voting
stock to keep voting control with insiders.
128 Indeed, companies have shown an increased willingness to lobby their largest shareholders as a
defense to activism. See Sonali Basak & Beth Jinks, It’s Getting Harder to Keep the Barbarians at the Gate—
and It’s This Guy’s Job, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Feb. 1, 2017). Note that this analysis assumes that the
company employs a majority-of-the-shares voting standard for director elections, as many do. See
Stephen Choi, Jill E, Fisch, Marcel Kahan, & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board
Accountability?, 83 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1119 (2016).
127

22

million.129 Most of these costs were incurred in attempts to sway retail investors and
passive fund managers using websites, social media, television appearances, video
recordings, automated dial in messages, and marketing pamphlets.130
Proctor & Gamble’s expenses from the proxy battle were even greater, totaling
$100 million.131 This reveals another cost of weakly motivated voting—the company
may incur expanses trying to overpower the investor base’s rational apathy. By
contrast, if Company A performs badly, management will be able to interface with a
small group of informed investors who will already be aware of the company’s
problems and will be interested in finding a solution—a much less expensive task.132
In addition, because management will more easily be able to take the temperature of
its voting investors, it will be more likely to reach an agreement with informed
investors, obviating the need for those shareholders to wage expensive and
disruptive proxy contests.133
This is not to say that informed investors will always agree about what
constitutes the right course of action for the company. The informed investors may
have different investment strategies or goals that cause them to disagree.134 Indeed, it
may be that a vocal minority of informed investors agitate for a course of action to
benefit its own short term interests.135 But management of Company A need only be
Hamlin Lovell, Shareholder Activism Knows No Bounds, SRZ THE HEDGE FUND JOURNAL (Dec.
2017), available at: https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/154113/The-Hedge-FundJournal-Shareholder-Activism-Knows-No-Bounds-Dece.pdf.
130 Id. For another example, take the battle between Elliot Management and Arconic, a steel company,
in which the activist hedge fund sought to install four directors at the company’s annual meeting. The
activist investor not only made its case to investors in presentations and meetings, it mailed thousands
of mini-player devices to retail investors each with one short four-minute video explaining the
activist’s position at a targeted company. Ronald Orol, Paul Singer’s Activist Fund is Sending Video Players
to Thousands of Arconic Shareholders, THESTREET (May 12, 2017), available at:
https://www.thestreet.com/story/14131164/1/paul-singer-s-activist-fund-is-sending-video-playersto-thousands-of-arconic-shareholders.html Management, too, solicited the retail shareholders, as well
as the institutional investors, for months as the activist campaign waged on.
131 Id.
132 See M. Todd Henderson and Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Index Funds Are Great For Investors, Risky for
Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2017), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/indexfunds-are-great-for-investors-risky-for-corporate-governance-1498170623.s
133 See Joseph McCahery, Zacharias Sautner, & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate
Governance Preference of Institutional Investors, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2016), available at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.12393/ful (providing evidence that investors only
resort to the proxy machinery when informal engagement fails).
134 See Iman Anabtawi and Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255 (2008).
135 Critics of this proposal will likely contend that Company A may have higher transaction costs
because amplifying the power of informed investors will empower activist investors, who will use
their muscle to distract and influence management, perhaps even waging a higher number of proxy
battles with the company. But just as the voting power of activist investors will be amplified, the
power of other informed investors, including actively managed mutual funds and pension funds, will
be too. And thus, those activist investors will still have to convince smart investors with longer-term
interests in the company that their course of action is warranted. Likewise, management will have a
better understanding of the wishes and preferences of their informed, engaged investors and thus will
be less likely to cave to an activist out of a misplaced fear that it could catalyze the voting power of a
majority of shareholders. By contrast, management will be more likely to settle with an activist if it
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responsive to the needs of the majority of the informed shareholders. And the
majority of the informed shareholders is more likely to push the company in the
right direction when it can be heard clearly than when it is drowned out by the voices
of weakly motivated voters.
Relatedly, the market for corporate control should function more efficiently in
the case of Company A. In the first place, it is difficult and costly to acquire a large
voting block from disparate retail shareholders. In addition, passive funds often
refuse to tender their shares to hostile acquirers, even if they believe the deal is
beneficial, because the gap between the offering price and closing price would
interfere with the fund’s ability to track the index.136 Thus, the greater the number of
nonvoting shares in the hands of weakly motivated voters, the easier it will be to
accomplish a takeover, which further reduces agency costs.137
ii.

Transaction Costs and the Risk of Suboptimal Outcomes

Issuing nonvoting shares for the weakly motivated shareholders to buy provides
two additional benefits. First, Company A will have lower transaction costs than
Company B. For one, Company B must incur higher costs associated with managing
a larger number of voting investors, including preparing and mailing voting materials
and handling calls and questions.138 The weakly motivated voters, too, will incur
greater costs when they buy voting shares such as the costs of evaluating proposals,
evaluating recommendations from third party proxy advisors, and casting votes.
Second, all shareholders should prefer Company A equity because eliminating
weakly motivated shareholder voting reduces the risk of sub-optimal voting
outcomes. By contrast, Company B faces the risk that the uninformed voters, if they
decide to exercise their votes, will move the company in the wrong direction—a risk
that is all the more likely in our modern world of passive shareholder ownership.139

understands that the activist has the support of a majority of the thinking investors, obviating the
need for an expensive proxy contest.
136 See Tender Offers: The New Paradigm and SEC M&A Updates, Morrison & Foerster Presentation (Aug.
9, 2013), available at: https://media2.mofo.com/documents/130809-tender-offers-new-paradigmsec-ma-updates.pdf; Some Tender Offer Quirks, Kirkland & Ellis M&A Update (Oct. 9, 2009), available
at: https://www.kirkland.com/files/MA_Update/100909.pdf.
137 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965)
(positing that shareholder participation in governance is not necessary to ensure firm efficiency so
long as a robust market for corporate control exists).
138 The cost of mailing the proxy statement alone is not insignificant—in 2011, Broadridge estimated
that it cost 12,000 companies $425 million to simply mail the proxies to shareholders. Maxwell
Murphy, Mailing Proxy Statements Costs Companies Big Bucks, WALL ST. J, (Feb. 21, 2012), available at:
https://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/02/21/mailing-proxy-statements-costs-companies-big-bucks/.
Indeed, it is because of these costs that the SEC adopted e-proxy rules that permit public companies
to make proxy materials available via the internet in lieu of mailing a paper copy. But so far, these
rules have not materially decreased the expenses associated with creating and distributing proxy
materials.
139 Recall that weakly motivated voters are more likely to be right than wrong about the best course of
action for the company. According to Condorcet’s jury theorem, more votes will improve the
outcome of a majority vote so long as the voters are more than fifty percent likely to be right. Thus,
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Although retail shareholders rarely vote, passive funds almost always do. This is
because SEC regulations dictate that fund managers have a fiduciary duty to vote
when doing so is in the best interests of their investors, and this mandate has been
widely interpreted as requiring mutual funds to vote.140 Moreover, regular voting may
benefit the institution that houses the passive fund, even when it does not benefit
passive fund investors. For example, the institution may use its voting record to
appeal to clients, such as public pension funds that generally require outside asset
managers to have governance expertise.141
But when passive funds intervene in governance, their influence is unlikely to
move the company in the right direction for two reasons. In the first place, because
weakly motivated passive funds lack firm-specific information and governance
expertise, they are especially likely to follow preset, one-size-fits-all voting guidelines
on governance questions.142 But there is no consensus about universal governance
best practices—decades of scholarship has concluded only that good governance is
endogenous to the particular firm. As such, a one-size-fits-all approach to
governance imposed across vastly different firms could make many firms worse
off.143
Moreover, weakly motivated passive funds have strong conflicts of interest.
Passive fund managers, like other mutual fund managers, have their compensation
tied to the amount of assets that flow into the fund, rather than the fund’s
performance.144 And while actively managed mutual funds can attract investors based
by limiting the pool to the informed, motivated voters, voting will be more likely to generate the
efficiency-maximizing solution.
140 See Lund, supra n. [], at 34.
141 For example, CalPERS, the largest U.S. pension fund (with $300 billion in assets under
management) states clearly in its Investment Policy that “CalPERS expects all … external managers of
CalPERS capital to integrate the CalPERS Principles into investment decision making, including
proxy voting….” CalPERS Total Fund Investment Policy, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/totalfund-investment-policy.pdf.
142 The three largest passive fund providers—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street—have very
similar voting guidelines that they follow closely. Each institution articulates a preference for director
independence, a relationship between long-term company performance and executive compensation,
and a skepticism about anti-takeover provisions and major changes to the corporation, such as
mergers, reorganizations, or changes to capital structure. See State Street Global Advisors, Global Proxy
Voting and Engagement Principles (March 2016), available at: https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Global-Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-Principles20160301.pdf; BlackRock, Global Corporate Governance and Engagement Principles (2014);
Vanguard, Vanguard’s Approach to Corporate Governance, https://about.vanguard.com/vanguardproxy-voting/. These institutions also rely on ISS and Glass Lewis for certain issues, and those also
follow one-size-fits-all voting policies. See Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business, supra note []. As a result, the
three entities are able to achieve high consistency in voting. For example, at Vanguard in 2015, only 6
out of 100,000 proposals featured a fund voting differently than its other funds. Fitchner et al., supra
note [], at 20-21.
143As just one example, a recent study found that the average risk-adjusted return for companies that
followed proxy advisor recommendations when adjusting compensation was 0.44% lower than firms
whose changes to compensation were unrelated to proxy advisor recommendations. See David
Larcker, Alan McCall, & Gaizka Ormazabal, Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of
ISS, Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper (2011).
144 See WILLIAM BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW (OUP 2016).
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on past performance (and thus, future expectations of performance), passive fund
managers have only two ways to compete: they can compete on the basis of fees and
they can develop strong relationships with clients. And because corporate pension
fund assets are one of the largest pools of capital invested in passive funds, a passive
fund manager may be especially inclined to support management so as to preserve
the fund’s access to the company’s 401(k) accounts.145
For these reasons, passive fund voting can result in sub-optimal outcomes for
the company. Suppose that a shareholder at Company B has proposed to separate
the position of Chairman from CEO.146 The insiders vociferously oppose the
proposal, arguing that splitting the position will make it harder for the board to
understand business operations, which are highly technical. Sixty percent of the
informed investors also disagree with the proposal for the same reasons (the others,
for idiosyncratic reasons, support the proposal147). Eighty-six percent of the weakly
motivated voters support the proposal because it aligns with their internal
governance guidelines, which identify good governance standards to be applied
across all portfolio companies. Fourteen percent of the weakly motivated voters
follow the advice from their active fund counterparts and vote against the proposal
or simply abstain. In this case, the proposal will pass, even though the clear majority
of informed investors disagree with it.148
* *

*

These examples demonstrate why all investors should prefer Company A to
Company B ex ante. In the first place, informed investors will understand that the
agents are more likely to be attuned to shareholder interests, which will reduce
monitoring costs and costs of intervention when problems emerge. Likewise, weakly
See Simon C. Y. Wong, How Conflicts of Interest Thwart Institutional Investor Stewardship,
BUTTERWORTHS J. INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FIN. L. (Sept. 2011), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925485.
146 Whether to separate the CEO and chairman positions is a hotly contested issue in corporate
governance. In recent years, the trend has consistently moved toward separation in spite of the fact
that the literature does not consider it to be unambiguously positive. David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan,
Chairman and CEO: The Controversy Over Board Leadership Structure, Stanford Closer Look Series (June 24,
2016), available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2800244. In fact, there is little research that separating
the two positions improves firm performance or governance quality, and a recent study has found that
forced separation due to shareholder pressure is associated with a decrease in market valuation and
lower future operating performance. See Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, & Xiaohui Liu, CEO And Board
Chair Roles: To Split or Not to Split?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1595 (2011).
147 Perhaps, for example, some of the informed investors are activist hedge funds that believe that
separating the CEO and chairman position will make the company an easier takeover target.
148 Although this is a simplified example for explanatory purposes, this is not an uncommon
occurrence. In light of the growing market share of passive institutional investors and their largely
uniform preferences regarding governance, passive funds begun already influenced voting outcomes.
A recent empirical study has shown that an increase in passive fund ownership is correlated with the
successful implementation of controversial shareholder governance proposals, including proposals
that remove poison pills and other takeover defenses, and eliminate dual class structures. Gormley et
al., Passive Investors, supra n. [] at 4-5. In addition, passive institutional investors are usually viewed as
the tie breakers for close proxy contests and regularly support management even when the majority of
active investors support the dissident slate. See, e.g., Henderson & Lund, Index Funds Are Great For
Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, supra n. [].
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motivated voters will more highly value an investment that does not require them to
incur costs in becoming informed, evaluating proposals from other shareholders, and
casting a vote.149 And both informed and uninformed shareholders will benefit from
a reduced risk of bad outcomes. For these reasons, a company that provides
nonvoting stock for weakly motivated voters to purchase will make all parties better
off.
Although offering nonvoting and voting stock is a relatively new phenomenon in
U.S. public companies, the concept of unlinking voting rights and the residual
interest is not. A privately held company that is solely financed by debt provides one
simple example. In that case, the debt holders have a claim on the residual value, but
they are given no control rights unless the company is in financial distress. Such
arrangements are uncontroversial, even though the residual claimants lack both the
ability to costlessly exit and exercise voice through voting.
Consider also the example of a limited partnership, which includes a general
partner, as well as limited partners.150 The general partner is tasked with managing
the company’s day-to-day affairs; the limited partners provides equity but are
uninvolved in company operations. For this reason, the partners often agree to
restrict the limited partners’ voting privileges to specific issues, such as amendments
to the partnership agreement. The parties may also depart from proportional voting
to allocate fewer voting rights to the limited partners.151 In other words, the parties
The “empty voting” literature reveals that derivative products have the potential to enable
shareholders to efficiently decouple voting rights from economic interest, which could generate
similar governance benefits. See Black & Hu, supra n. []; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and
Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 625 (2008). And
there is evidence that passively managed funds broadly lend out their shares, which suggests that they
do trade voting power for a fee. See Simon Moore, How Securities Lending Makes Some ETFs Free,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014); Susan Kerr Christofferson, Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto, & Adam
V. Reed, Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. OF FIN. 2897 (2007). But the problem with the
decoupling solution is that there is no way for companies or investors to know whether it will be used
to improve corporate governance. Indeed, the more likely outcome has been for hedge funds to use
derivative products to neutralize their economic interest in a company and then use their voting
power to benefit other investments. See Black and Hu, supra n. []. By contrast, using nonvoting shares
to improve governance avoids this risk: companies that offer nonvoting stock will continue to be
controlled by shareholders with a financial interest in the company. Moreover, the dual class structure
will be apparent to investors ex ante, who can therefore account for structure when purchasing shares.
Equity decoupling, by contrast, presents a hidden risk for investors.
Although this paper assumes for the sake of simplicity that equity decoupling is not possible,
it is worth noting that the continued availability of nonvoting shares could ameliorate problems
associated with empty voting: Weakly motivated voters are the most likely to part with their votes. If
weakly motivated voters purchase nonvoting stock, they can continue to lend their shares, but there
will be less of a risk that their voting power will be used in ways that could harm the company.
150 Some limited partnerships, such as the master limited partnership, are publically traded. In a master
limited partnership, the limited partners have no voting rights at all. The general partner runs the firm,
which produces a return on the limited partners’ investment.
151 As another example, consider the rise of subordinated second liens as an alternative to other forms
of unsecured debt. Those liens are often called “silent second liens” because the second lien holder
contractually agrees to refrain from exercising rights in bankruptcy until the holders of the senior first
are paid in full. See Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony Casey, & David Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, U. Penn
Inst. For Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-25 (2016). In other words, the junior investor and
hence the residual owner voluntarily gives up control because doing so benefits all parties involved—
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designing the limited partnership’s structure often depart from a proportional voting
system to put control in the hands of people with expertise and better information.
152

But in the case of public companies, nonvoting stock has not yet used with the
explicit purpose of enticing and empowering informed outside stakeholders. More
often, companies offer nonvoting stock to all of their outside investors, including the
informed investors. So, what should be done to help companies to unlock the
potential of nonvoting shares? The answer is not much, as will be explained in the
following sections.
B. Nonvoting Shares: Demand-Side Issues
Companies seeking to reduce agency costs and transaction costs associated with
voting need only take one step: offer two classes of stock, one nonvoting and one
voting, to the public. When this happens, beneficial sorting will occur because
nonvoting shares generally trade at a discount, averaging 3-5%, to voting shares.153
They are otherwise identical investments, with the same rights to dividends and cash
flows. This makes them especially appealing investments for weakly motivated
voters, who by definition, do not value their vote very much (if at all).154

the first lien holder benefits from avoiding interference from the silent second in bankruptcy, and the
silent second receives a higher interest rate. See David Batty & Jo Ann Brighton, Silent Second Liens –
Will Bankruptcy Courts Keep the Peace?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2005).
152 However, the analysis in this paper does not extend beyond shareholder democracy to civic
democtacy. First and most importantly, shareholder democracy is not really a democracy at all—votes
are allocated on a per-share basis, meaning that the larger the investment, the larger the investor’s
voting power. That is because voting is a means to an end—efficient corporate governance. By
contrast, there are important sociological justifications for voting in civic elections that are not present
in the corporate context. Citizen voting is thought to further self-actualization and educate the public
about important issues, among other things. Second, democratic control is more important for a civic
democracy, in which legislators have substantial power over the lives of citizens, than it is for a
corporate democracy. Finally, shareholders have other accountability mechanisms available to them:
they can exit, sue, or rely on external and internal employment markets, capital markets, and the
market for corporate control to discipline management. Citizens, by contrast, generally lack the ability
to exit when displeased with government, as well as the other accountability mechanisms listed above.
153 See Price Differentials Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, Stout Advisory Services, available at:
https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/price-differentials-between-voting-and-nonvotingstock. The presence of a voting premium is somewhat surprising. Most often, nonvoting shares are
treated exactly the same as voting shares for cash flow purposes. They receive the same dividends, the
same rights in repurchase, and the same treatment in any reorganization. And yet, investors pay a
premium for voting stock for two reasons. First, in the event that the company becomes a takeover
target, the value of the vote will become more valuable. Second, if a firm is underperforming, the vote
will rise in value because the right to influence management will be perceived as being more valuable.
For example, the market may perceive that the voting shareholders have a greater ability to use their
voting power to advocate for their interests. For these reasons, the voting premium is rarely static; it
varies based on the market’s view of the quality of management and other circumstances facing the
firm.
154 Some dual class companies that offer low-voting stock instead of nonvoting stock may also reduce
agency costs associated with voting, although the smaller premium may reduce the incidence of
beneficial sorting. See Warren Buffet, Memo: Comparative Rights and Relative prices of Berkshire
Class
A
and
Class
B
Stock
(Jan.
20,
2010),
available
at:
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In other words, companies like Zillow, Google, and Under Armour—all
companies that offer investors the choice between nonvoting and high voting
shares—may increase the value of their companies by virtue of their dual-class
structure, and not just for the reasons that those companies typically espouse. Put
differently, the dual-class structure will benefit investors if the weakly motivated
voters buy the nonvoting stock, and the informed voters buy the voting stock,
because the company will reduce firm-wide agency costs.155 And the weakly
motivated voters should gravitate toward the nonvoting stock not just because it is
cheaper, but also because it allows them to save on costs associated with voting.
In theory, this point is obvious. But reality, of course, is more complicated. Take
Google as an example. Recall that Google split its stock in 2014, creating nonvoting
shares (Class C).156 The Class A voting shares have consistently traded at a premium
(ranging from 1 to 5%) to the C shares in spite of an equal treatment clause
providing that in the event of a change of control, the Class C shares will be eligible
for the same rights and privileges as the A shares.157 And despite a non-negligible
voting premium, the three institutional investors that primarily invest in passive
investment vehicles—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—hold nearly identical
amounts of voting and nonvoting stock.158
This presents a puzzle. Why are these institutional investors that primarily invest
in passive investment vehicles not gravitating to nonvoting stock? Moreover, why are
they among the investors lobbying stock indices to exclude companies that issue
nonvoting stock?
One answer that CII—which represents Vanguard, Blackrock, and State Street—
emphasizes is that so long as nonvoting stocks are included on an index, their
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/compab.pdf (positing that is not very likely that the low-voting
stock would trade at more than 1% of a discount to the voting stock).
155 Note that in the case of Google, the decision to use a dual class structure to keep control with the
founding group was made in 2004, years before the company recapitalization that called for the
issuance of nonvoting stock and voting stock to the public. And even if the decision to keep control
with the founders resulted in inefficiencies, the choice to recapitalize by issuing two share classes to
the public may have actually reduced costs associated with the entrenching structure.
156 See Stephen Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2013), available at: https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-givesgoogle-founders-tighter-control/ There are also Class B shares, owned by insiders, that have ten votes
per share. Those shares are not available to the public. Id.
157 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Google’s Stock Settlement May Not Do Much for Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2013), available at: https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/googles-stock-settlementmay-not-do-much-for-shareholders/?_r=0 (discussing the terms of the settlement).
158
Holders
of
Alphabet
Inc.
(GOOGL),
Yahoo
Finance,
available
at:
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOGL/holders?p=GOOGL (showing that Vanguard holds
19.9 million shares); Holders of Alphabet Inc. (GOOG), Yahoo Finance, available at:
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/holders?p=GOOG (showing that Vanguard holds 19.9
million shares). Retail shareholders, however, make up a much smaller percentage of the owners of
the voting shares: Google A has about 11 percent of its shares held by retail investors, versus 18
percent of Google C. Id. And this is likely because retail shareholders understand that nonvoting stock
is cheaper and offers the same returns. See Bram de Haas, Google: Why I Prefer the Nonvoting Shares,
SEEKING ALPHA (June 4, 2015), available at: https://seekingalpha.com/article/3236926-google-whyi-prefer-the-non-voting-shares.
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passive funds will be forced to buy them.159 That may explain why a company like
Vanguard owns the same number of Google A and Google C shares—if both are
weighted equally on the index, as they are on the S&P 500,160 the S&P 500 tracker
funds will be forced to buy both share classes in equal quantities. And because these
passive institutional investors are forced to buy nonvoting shares that are listed on an
index, CII argues that a market solution—reduced investor demand for dual class
company shares—is unlikely to manifest, and thus, top-down restrictions are
necessary.161 In other words, the large institutional providers of passive funds are
essentially lobbying the indices to save them from themselves.162
But if that were the only reason, there is a market solution—passive funds can
depart from a pure tracking methodology, which would require the fund to buy every
company in the index, in favor of purchasing a basket of representative companies
that mimic the performance of an index. In fact, many do.163 In other words, passive
funds could refuse to buy the shares of some, if not all, dual-class companies if they
were concerned about underperformance, weighting other companies differently to
track the index’s performance.
In time, however, it is more likely that the market would push index fund
providers to purchase nonvoting, rather than voting stock. That is because passive
funds that purchase nonvoting shares will benefit from lower costs (and thus, higher
relative performance) than rival funds. Those funds will not only save on expenses
associated with voting, but also benefit from purchasing the discounted stock, which

Alexandra Scaggs, Investor Group to Exchanges: Stop Dual Class Listings, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2012),
available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443749204578050431073959840.
160 The S&P 500 is computed by weighted average market capitalization, and because the stock split
did not affect Google’s market capitalization, the two share classes are weighted equally on the index.
161 The largely passive institutional investors explain that they are opposed to nonvoting shares
because without an ability to exit, their voice is even more important. See, e.g., F. William McNabb III,
Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder Engagement, Harvard Forum for Corporate
Governance
and
Financial
Regulation
(June
24,
2015),
available
at:
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significantshareholder-engagement/. And it may be that some passive funds, in spite of their acute collective
action problems, find the benefits of investing in governance worth the costs. More likely, this
argument provides an excuse for holding on to power that would benefit the institution in other ways,
as will be discussed.
162 Recently, BlackRock reversed its position on this issue, stating in a memo: “BlackRock is a strong
advocate for equal voting rights for all shareholders. However, we disagree with index providers’
recent decisions to exclude certain companies from broad market indices due to governance concerns.
Those decisions could limit our index-based clients’ access to the investable universe of public
companies and deprive them of opportunities for returns.” BlackRock, A Potential Solution For Voting
Rights and Index Inclusion Issues (Oct. 2017), available at: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/enbr/literature/publication/blk-a-potential-solution-for-voting-rights-and-index-inclusion-issuesoctober2017.pdf. Vanguard and State Street made similar statements in the wake of FTSE Russel’s
decision to bar dual class companies. See James Rufus Koren & Paresh Dave, Snap won’t give shareholders
voting rights. For that, it’s being shunned by a major stock index, L.A. Times (July 28, 2017), available at:
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-snap-russell-indices-20170727-story.html.
163 There are Now More Indexes Than Stocks, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 12, 2017), available at:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/there-are-now-more-indexes-than-stocks.
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would increase the fund’s returns.164 Investors, in turn, should gravitate to those
discounted passive funds, which would promise stable returns for even lower fees.
A few considerations may limit the operation of these market forces, however,
and cause weakly motivated voters to continue to buy voting stock. First, as
mentioned, the institution that houses the passive funds may benefit from enhanced
voting power. Most obviously, voting power could allow the institution’s active fund
managers to be more effective when they intervene in governance. However, when
passive funds benefit from information generated by actively managed funds,165 they
cease to be uninformed.166 As such, a passive fund that buys voting stock for this
reason does not present a governance problem.
More worrisome is the risk that the institution would hold on to voting power to
benefit the institution’s political interests or appease clients. As an example, CalPERS
and other public pensions are vocal proponents of good governance and are bound
to consider governance expertise when selecting outside asset managers.167 For that
reason, the institution may believe that voting will signal engagement and help it
attract assets from these investors. Retail investors, too, may seek investment
vehicles that advertise themselves as being active players in governance.168 In
addition, voting power can also be used to appease another key client: company
management, which is an important source of corporate 401(k) assets invested in
passive funds.169

The nonvoting index fund would likely have higher returns because an initial investment would
allow the investor to purchase more shares of the nonvoting ETF or index fund, generating more
dividends over time. Moreover, in the event of a takeover, the holder of the nonvoting fund would
have more shares eligible for the premium (assuming the company had an equal treatment clause).
165 For evidence that beneficial information sharing occurs across large institutional investors, see
Michelle Lowry and Peter Iliev, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 446 (2015)
(demonstrating that although 25% of mutual funds blindly follow ISS recommendations, larger
mutual funds and funds that belong to larger fund families engage in active voting more often and
theorizing that this is because those large funds can spread their research costs and benefits across
various funds).
166 There is a difference between following advice from informed voters, which have an incentive to
maximize shareholder value, and third party proxy advisors, who suffer from many of the same biases
and conflicts as weakly motivated voters. See Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business, supra note [] (“[A]s
everyone connected with the institutional shareholder voting process knows or should know, proxy
advisors’ voting recommendations are driven by inflexible, one-size-fits-all voting policies and
simplistic analytic models designed to utilize standard and easily accessible inputs that can be derived
from readily available data and to avoid any need for particularized research or the application of
meaningful judgment.”).
167
See
CalPERS
Global
Governance
Principles
(2015),
available
at:
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/global-principles-corporate-governance.pdf
(explaining that improving corporate governance is at the core of the pension’s investment strategy).
168 See, e.g., Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Equity Strategy Focus Point, ESG: Good Companies Can
Make Good Stocks (Dec. 18, 2016) (estimating the growth of assets in socially responsible investment
vehicles to be 33% over two years, with much of this growth driven by millennials, 90% of which
engage in “impact investing” or want to).
169 In 2015, 401(k) assets under management totaled $4.7 trillion, with 60% held in mutual funds. Sean
Collins et al., The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, ICI Research
Perspective (2016), available at: http://www.ici.org/pdf/per22-04.pdf; see also Simon C. Y. Wong, How
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Second, weakly motivated shareholders may gravitate toward voting stock for its
option value. Perhaps the weakly motivated voters will anticipate that the company
will become a takeover target at some future date. This may explain why equal
treatment clauses, or clauses that provide that minority shareholders will receive
equal consideration in the event of a change of control, are so common in dual-class
companies—those companies worry that investors will shun the nonvoting shares if
they anticipate unequal treatment in a takeover.170 But equal treatment clauses have
been bypassed in the past,171 and so some weakly motivated shareholders may prefer
to buy voting stock to guarantee that they will share in any future takeover premium.
Relatedly, weakly motivated shareholders might purchase voting shares to protect
against other forms of disparate treatment. For example, if the holders of voting
stock are employees, the insiders could pay them higher salaries or give them other
perquisites to induce their loyalty in the case of a dispute.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that all weakly motivated voters would purchase
nonvoting stock. But even imperfect sorting could lower agency and transaction
costs. And the prospect of buying discounted stock and saving on voting expenses
should increase the appeal of nonvoting shares to weakly motivated voters, meaning
that sorting should increase over time.
One more caveat is necessary. Just as weakly motivated voters may purchase
voting stock, it is also possible that some informed investors will gravitate toward
discounted nonvoting shares. In other words, the presence of nonvoting shares
could exacerbate the collective action, free riding, and passivity problems inherent in
dispersed ownership.
This result is possible but unlikely. Informed voters would be most likely to free
ride when the voting premium is very high. But in such cases, the market values the
vote highly precisely because of the potential benefits that flow from the ability to
exercise influence—perhaps the company is likely to become a takeover target, or
perhaps the company is poorly managed and thus the voting shareholders will be
best positioned to advocate for their interests. Under these circumstances, the
informed investors will be more likely to pay a premium for voting stock to secure
these benefits. In addition, the weakly motivated voters will have a harder time
passing up the opportunity to secure heavily discounted nonvoting stock.
By contrast, when the company is well run and the market is optimistic about
management, the voting premium may be small, perhaps as little as one percent.172 In
that case, the informed voters are likely to view the premium as a small price to pay
Conflicts of Interest Thwart Institutional Investor Stewardship, BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L.
481 (Sept. 2011), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925485.
170 Blue Apron, Zillow, Square, GoPro, and Snapchat have all gone public with multiclass structures
and have included an equal treatment clause in their charter. See Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal
Treatment Clauses, 101 YALE L. J. FORUM at 104 (forthcoming 2017).
171 See JP Konig, Moneyness Blog, Riding on the Coattails of Sergey Brin and Larry Page…Or Not, (Dec. 4,
2015), available at: http://jpkoning.blogspot.ca/2015/12/riding-on-sergey-brin-and-larry-pages.html
(explaining that the “Canadian business community has a long history of successfully evading the
triggering of coattail provisions” and providing examples.).
172 See Stout Advisory Servies Report, supra n. [].
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for the ability to exercise control at some future date and purchase the voting stock
for its option value. Even if the informed voters do decide to join the free riders and
purchase nonvoting stock during this calm period, they will have the ability and
incentive to purchase voting shares at some future point, when problems at the
company manifest.
Of course, there is something perverse about requiring informed voters to pay a
premium for activity that benefits all shareholders. It would be better if the informed
voters received a discount or some payment for their purchase of voting stock,
rather than the weakly motivated shareholders who are taking a free ride. However,
the informed shareholder who purchases voting shares at a company that has
channeled its uninformed voters toward nonvoting stock will get more for her
money—a more powerful vote, a more valuable company. Therefore, although
encouraging weakly motivated voters to bypass their governance obligations is
suboptimal (it would be better if nobody took free rides at all), it is preferable to a
world in which weakly motivated voters dilute the voice of informed voters.
C. Nonvoting Shares: Supply-Side Issues
Although weakly motivated voters should have incentives to buy nonvoting
shares, the question of whether companies can be counted on to supply them in the
right numbers and for the right reasons is more complicated. In theory, so long as
market participants are not restricted from issuing nonvoting equity, market pressure
should encourage certain companies to issue nonvoting stock to some, but likely not
all, outside investors. In other words, because the company wants to get the highest
price of its shares, it should issue nonvoting stock not for entrenchment purposes,
but rather to increase the voting power of informed investors, which would increase
the value of the company’s equity.
But there are reasons to believe that management might not always use
nonvoting stock in this way. The first reason is technical—it would be difficult for
the company to ascertain how much nonvoting stock to issue ex ante because that
number depends on the composition of the shareholder base, which is always
changing.173 Second and more importantly, the insider group may use nonvoting
stock to silence investors so that they can reap private benefits of control. Even
though this will dampen the share price, those costs would be shared with other
equity holders. Indeed, nonvoting shares are generally used to keep control with
insiders, rather than empower informed investors. And even though this function
can be efficiency-maximizing, the prospect of entrenchment has motivated much of
the backlash against nonvoting shares.
What can we infer from the fact that nonvoting shares have not been used to
sort between informed and weakly motivated voters? It is possible that management
cannot ever be counted on to use nonvoting shares for this purpose. Management
may fear that using nonvoting stock to empower outside investors will magnify the
The amount of insider stock is continually in flux as well—often, employees are paid in stock
options that can be exercised at any time, making it more difficult to ascertain the level of insider
ownership.
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influence of hedge fund activists, who are increasingly likely to pursue campaigns
directed at ousting the CEO and reducing management compensation.174 But this is
unlikely—there are many high quality management teams that would benefit from
using nonvoting stock as a bonding mechanism and to signal their quality to outside
investors. Other insiders (including the venture capitalists that will cash out after a
company’s IPO) would also benefit from the issuance of nonvoting stock under
these circumstances and should demand it. It is therefore puzzling that we have not
yet seen nonvoting stock used for this explicit purpose.
It is possible that the market is currently in disequilibrium, and that the potential
of nonvoting stock has yet to be unlocked. True, the existence of nonvoting stock is
as old as the corporate form itself, but trends in corporate governance and changes
in financial markets have greatly increased its appeal as a tool to reduce agency costs.
In the past ten years, shareholder power has grown dramatically. 175 Shareholders now
have the ability to directly intervene and weigh in on wide-ranging corporate issues,
from executive compensation to corporate strategy. At the same time, the
shareholder base has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of passive
institutional investors with agency problems of their own, as well as conflicts of
interests.176 To protect against distortions that occur when large passive institutional
investors wield substantial voting power, companies may find the benefits of
nonvoting stock to be too great to ignore. That is, so long as companies that seek to
issue nonvoting stock do not face legal or market barriers, which would deter
innovation of this kind.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW

This paper demonstrates that nonvoting stock can enable a company to operate
more efficiently when certain conditions are met. A prohibition on nonvoting shares,
therefore, would prevent some firms from implementing optimal equity structures,
harming performance and increasing the company’s cost of capital. Applying this
analysis, the next section considers recently enacted and proposed restrictions on
dual-class company structures and concludes that they are misguided. It then offers
another possible path for reform—prohibiting companies from issuing only
nonvoting shares to the public.
A. Misguided Policies
As discussed, the recent controversy over dual-class stock has motivated
investors and investor advocacy groups to lobby against dual-class structures and the
use of nonvoting shares. Their actions have not fallen on deaf ears: both Dow Jones
S&P 500 and Russell FTSE will not list Snap and other companies with nonvoting
stock in their U.S. benchmarks. Those indices are the biggest drivers of passive fund
demand for U.S. stocks, and so their decisions are likely to eliminate dual-class IPOs
in the United States. Moreover, the stock indices’ decision to eschew companies with
See Thomas Keusch, Hedge Fund Activists and CEO Contracting, Working Paper (March 6, 2017),
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746135.
175 See Thomas et. al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism.
176 See Lund, supra n. []; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Hirst, supra n. [].
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nonvoting stock will undo much of the beneficial sorting that had already occurred:
instead of being channeled toward purchasing nonvoting stock, weakly motivated
passive funds will more likely purchase voting shares, as companies like Snapchat will
be excluded from their baseline indices.
These policy changes ignore the fact that nonvoting stock can play an important
role in improving firm efficiency by reducing agency costs and transaction costs
associated with voting.177 And these benefits will only grow as demand for passive
investment vehicles increases.178 In many cases, therefore, companies should be
encouraged to issue some portion of nonvoting shares, rather than deterred from
doing so. And although very few U.S. companies offer voting and nonvoting stock
to the public,179 it is likely that market pressure would push more and more
companies in this direction, as it has already done. By deterring companies from
issuing nonvoting stock, the indices impede this beneficial experimentation in
company structuring.180
The recent wave of advocacy for mandatory sunset provisions for dual-class
companies is similarly wrongheaded.181 Sunset provisions ensure that dual-class
structures sunset after a pre-determined period of time, such as three to five years,
unless their extension is approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller. 182
These provisions are just one of many tools available to companies that seek to
reduce agency costs associated with dual-class structures.183 Requiring them,
however, is a crude solution, as it is unclear ex ante when the dual-class structure will
become inefficient. In addition, the solution is too extreme, because nonvoting
shares may provide important efficiency benefits for the company, and thus, the
sunset provision would undo those benefits at an arbitrary point in time. Providing
shareholders an opportunity to extend the dual-class structure lessens this concern,
Indeed, it is incongruous that the indexes are willing to list companies with other characteristics
that could be deemed entrenching, such as poison pills. That may be because the scholarly consensus
is that these pills can be welfare enhancing when used correctly. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Do
Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 845 (2002). But this paper reveals that nonvoting stock, like poison pills, has a beneficial
function in certain cases, and thus, should not be subject to a blanket prohibition.
178 See Lund, supra n. [] at [] (describing the rapid rise of passive funds and their growing influence over
corporate governance).
179 Although there are very few companies that issue both high and low voting stock to the public in
the U.S., the structure is more common in Europe and in Canada. In fact, a recent trend in Europe is
the “loyalty” share, or shares that accumulate voting rights the longer that they are held. For example,
in France, shares that are registered for two years automatically receive double voting rights under the
Florange Act. See David J. Berger, et. al., Tenure Voting at 297. Italy has also allowed companies to
grant two votes for every share held for at least two years. Id.
180 Cf. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,
48 J. FIN. 831, 868 (1993) (“The evidence from LBOs, leveraged restructurings, takeovers, and
venture capital firms has demonstrated that leverage, payout policy, and ownership structure (that is,
who owns the firm’s securities) do in fact affect organizational efficiency, cash flow, and therefore
value.”).
181 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note [].
182 Id.
183 Indeed, Google and Facebook both have sunset provisions for the dual class structure that are
triggered by certain events. In the case of Google, the classes would combine upon a liquidation of
the company. See S-1, supra n. [].
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but often, the shareholders tasked with approving the structure are the same weakly
motivated voters that warranted the use of nonvoting shares in the first place.184
B. Possible Restrictions
Even with a greater understanding of the benefits provided by dual-class
structures, it is likely that calls for regulation will continue. And if securities
regulators, stock exchanges, or stock indices are compelled to take a stance against
nonvoting stock, they should take a more moderate position: they could instead
prohibit or deter companies from offering only nonvoting stock to the public. In
other words, rather than a total prohibition on dual-class company structures, the law
(or indices adopting standards for inclusion) could require a company that issues
nonvoting stock to also issue a non-negligible amount of voting stock to the
public.185 FTSE Russel is moving in this direction—its proposed rules require
companies to have at least 5% of their voting rights across all share classes in the
hands of outside shareholders.186
It is true that offering only nonvoting stock to the public might be the most
efficient structure for certain companies. If investors were extremely confident in the
leadership of the company, perhaps they would pay the most for shares of a
company that offered only a single class of nonvoting shares to outside investors. It
is therefore possible that the Snap IPO was structured optimally at the time of the
offering.
But even if it were optimal to issue only nonvoting stock at the time of issuance,
it is unlikely to be optimal for an extended period.187 Over time, the advantages of
such a structure may decrease, especially for dynamic companies in which disruptive
innovations and a quick pace of change are expected.188 The costs of such a structure
are also likely to increase over time—insiders will probably dilute their economic
position in the company in order to diversify risk, which will only increase agency
cost problems. And even when the company’s structure has become patently
inefficient, insiders who reap private benefits of control could have an incentive to

For example, a passive institutional investor like Vanguard might get away with purchasing
nonvoting shares—investors wouldn’t complain about the lower fees, and probably wouldn’t notice
that some of the shares in the portfolio lacked voting rights. But Vanguard might worry that were it to
vote to extend a company’s dual class structure, this highly visible decision would attract the ire of
their clients.
185 This means that if the company issued only a handful of voting shares, it would qualify as an issuer
of nonvoting shares. The right number of voting shares will depend on each company, but ideally, the
number would sufficiently substantial that it would give the outside investors leverage over
management and potentially a path toward unseating management in the future. See Kastiel, supra note
[] (discussing mechanisms available to activist investors who wage successful campaigns at controlled
companies, most of which require the power to vote).
186 Chris Dieterich, Maureen Farrell & Sarah Krouse, Stock Indexes Push Back on Dual Class Listings,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2. 2017), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-indexes-push-backagainst-dual-class-listings-1501612170.
187 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra n. [].
188 Id.
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maintain it.189 When this happens, the informed investors will lack important
mechanisms that could accelerate change, such as the ability to nominate directors
and cast votes at annual meetings.190
When a company issues some voting shares to the public, however, it will be
vulnerable to influence from shareholders about the direction of the company,
including the efficiency of the dual-class structure. If the outside investors believe
that management is entrenched and insufficiently attuned to shareholder interests,
they have several legal tools at their disposal as a result of their voting rights. Those
outside shareholders can submit a shareholder proposal requesting reclassification of
the company’s stock.191 They can vote against board nominees or executive
compensation at the annual meeting.192 They can nominate a director candidate to
the board and encourage other voting shareholders to support her,193 or they can
threaten to veto M&A transactions initiated by the controlling shareholder.194 They
can even form coalitions with insiders in an attempt to unseat some of the
incumbents.
Id. These concerns have motivated calls for mandatory sunset provisions for dual class structures,
which for the reasons discussed, provide a clumsy and partial solution.
190 Holders of nonvoting stock can drum up negative publicity about the company as leverage for its
demands. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2151, 2175 (2001) (claiming that social norms matter and constrain controlling shareholders).
However, without some legal bargaining chip, such as the ability to veto an M&A transaction or
nominate a minority director, the insiders are much more likely to ignore the demands of a minority
shareholder. See Kobi Kastiel, supra note [] at 110 (reviewing activist campaigns waged against
controlled companies and finding that only 11% of those campaigns without a bargaining mechanism
other than the threat of a reputational penalty were successful). In addition, the likelihood of securing
media coverage for an activist campaign is strongly correlated with the decision to wage a proxy battle.
See id. at 115. Lawsuits against the company, too, are more successful when the minority shareholders
can point out that the company ignored its demands that were clearly articulated in a shareholder
vote.
191 See Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
192 See Section 951 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010) (giving
shareholders the right to cast an advisory vote on executive compensation).
193 Ronald Orol, Activist Investors Target Snapchat Parent Snap Over Non-voting IPO Shares, THESTREET
(Feb. 8, 2017), available at: https://www.thestreet.com/story/13993165/1/insurgents-rail-againstsnap-over-non-voting-ipo-shares.html (“Activist hedge funds can still target dual-class companies with
unequal voting structures by nominating director candidates in the hopes that a large vote of the
noninsider shareholders will back their nominees, sending an embarrassing message to the company
that change is needed.”). For companies that allow the right to nominate and elect minority directors,
this tool is even more powerful. See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled
Companies, 2016 COLUM. L. BUS. R. 61, 90 (2016). For example, an activist campaign targeting
Dillard’s, Inc., which had a dual class structure but allowed the minority shareholders to nominate a
director, was able to secure major changes, including compensation cuts, by using the ability to
nominate a director as a bargaining chip. See id. at 93.
194 In Delaware, companies are not required to get the approval of a majority of the minority voting
shareholders before consummating a conflicted going-private transaction, but courts incentivize
companies to secure such approval. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014)
(holding that a controlling stockholder’s related party transaction will be subject to the business
judgment rule if a proposed transaction receives both the affirmative recommendation of a
functioning special committee and approval by a majority of the minority stockholders). This provides
another important channel of activism at companies for minority shareholders. See Kastiel, Against All
Odds, supra n. [] at 101.
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Therefore, even though minority investors lack the power to change the
company’s structure unilaterally, a showing of unified outside investor displeasure
will send a clear message to management and the board, one that is harder to ignore.
It will also send a clear message to the capital markets and other investors,
depressing demand for and thus the price of the company’s shares (and complicating
future fundraising efforts).
If it seems implausible that a company would pay attention to a shareholder
without power to threaten management’s control, consider this example. In 2016,
Forest City Realty Trust Inc. agreed to abandon its dual-class structure that had
allocated voting control to the family that had run the company for the past hundred
years.195 Forest City reclassified its shares because of pressure from an activist
investor, Scopia Capital Management, that had a 9.8% stake in the company. Scopia
had no chance of acquiring control—even if the insiders had parted with their stock,
the high vote shares would convert to low vote shares upon a transfer—and thus
lacked the ability to threaten a proxy contest or engineer a takeover. Nonetheless,
Scopia’s persistent public campaign, coupled with threats to call for a nonbinding
vote on the structure, eventually moved the needle.
Likewise, in the case of Reader’s Digest, pressure from an activist investor sped
up the unwinding of the publisher’s dual-class structure. Reader’s Digest offered
voting and nonvoting shares to the public, but voting control remained with an
entity created by the founders.196 In the early 2000s, outside investors became
increasingly unhappy with the company’s structure and strategy and began to
pressure the company for changes. Most prominently, Highfields Capital
Management, an investment firm that owned about 10% of the nonvoting stock and
a small fraction of the voting stock, made an offer to buy the voting shares with the
explicit purpose of eliminating the dual-class structure.197 The company rejected the
offer, but the investor pressure accelerated discussions to reclassify the shares.198 One
month after the offer, the company agreed to replace its two classes of shares with a
single voting class.
There are other examples in which a dual-class company has bent to the wishes
of a minority investor with some voting power. In 2006, activist investor Morgan
Stanley Investment Management put pressure on the New York Times to eliminate
its dual-class structure. That structure permitted the low-vote Class A shareholders
to elect a minority (four out of thirteen) of the company’s directors.199 The company
resisted this pressure for two years, even after 42% of the Class A shareholders
David Benoit, Activist Pressures Ratner Family to Relax Control of Forest City, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10,
2016), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-pressures-ratner-family-to-relax-control-offorest-city-1470801603.
196 Matthew Rose, Reader’s Digest’s Shareholders To Give Up Control of Publisher, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15,
2002), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1018822198298046520.
197 Id.
198 Id. (noting that “pressure from Highfields accelerated their planning” to move to a single class
structure).
199 Joshua Chaffin, Hedge Fund Lashes Out at NYT Board, FIN. T. (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5eae7fba-cd3a-11dc-9b2b- 000077b07658.html#axzz42LvTOajM.
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withheld their votes for directors at the company’s 2007 annual meeting. 200
Eventually, Morgan Stanley exited the investment, but the campaign attracted the
attention of another group of activist investors, the hedge funds Harbinger Capital
Partners and Firebrand Partners. These funds eventually secured a settlement with
the company that allowed them to appoint their nominees to the board.201 And in the
years following the campaign, the company implemented the activists’ proposed
policy changes, reducing spending, lowering its operating costs, and divesting
underperforming assets.202
These examples demonstrate how shareholders with voting rights are able to
influence management even when they are not able to credibly threaten their
control.203 And although the founder’s grip on the company may be tight at the time
of the offering, that grip may loosen over time, providing even greater opportunity
for the voting shareholders to influence or even unseat management.
There is another reason why regulators might wish to prohibit companies from
issuing only nonvoting shares to the public: the companies that do this may avoid
certain disclosure requirements under securities law. For example, without issuing
voting securities, a company need not hold an annual meeting, nor provide a proxy
statement to shareholders, which would otherwise be required under Section 14(a) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.204 Those proxy statements include financial
statements, background information about the company’s directors including
potential conflicts of interest, board compensation, executive compensation, and the
Merissa Marr, New York Times Co. Relents on Board Seats, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 18,
2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120577291969142019
201 Id.
202 Kastiel, supra note [] at 63.
203 Advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation have also proven to be influential. For
example, in 2012, a strong showing of investor disapproval in the form of an advisory say-on-pay vote
by Citigroup shareholders against CEO Vikram Pandit’s pay package led to his departure and
substantial changes to executive compensation. 55% of Citigroup shareholders voted against the pay
package, which was taken as a strong signal of displeasure. See Jessica Silver‐Greenberg & Nelson D.
Schwartz, Citigroup’s Chief Rebuffed on Pay by Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2012), available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/citigroup‐shareholders‐reject‐ executive‐pay‐plan/; Tom
Braithwaite, Dan McCrum & Kara Scannell, Citigroup Sees Off Shareholder Revolt on Executive Pay, FIN. T.
(Apr. 24, 2013), available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef667544‐ace1‐11e2‐b27f‐
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dOEJ6hvL. One analyst described the vote as follows: “This is a milestone
for corporate America. When shareholders speak up about issues on which they’ve been complacent,
it’s definitely a wake-up call.” Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra. That was so even though the vote
was non-binding. Empirical evidence has generally revealed that Dodd-Frank’s mandatory say-on-pay
vote for public companies has influenced compensation practices, in spite of the fact that the vote is
nonbinding. See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy
Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay 3 (Working Paper 2013), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019239.
204 See Snap Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1. Snap did indicate in its SEC filings that it intends to
afford the holders of nonvoting stock the same materials it gives to its voting shareholders, although it
caveated that promise in ways that indicate that it plans to disclose less than would be required for
holders of voting stock. See Brian Shea, SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee Airs Concerns Over Multi-Tiered
Offerings Following Snap’s IPO, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation (May 9, 2017), available at: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/09/secs-investoradvisory-committee-airs-concerns-over-multi-tiered-offerings-following-snaps-ipo/#6b
200

39

composition of the audit committee.205 And this information would be of particular
interest to outside shareholders of a company that has such a high potential for
agency costs. Moreover, those disclosure requirements are not just important to
shareholders, but to regulators who monitor the company.
But that is not all. Issuers that offer only nonvoting stock to public are exempt
from other disclosure obligations that help investors and regulators understand what
company insiders are doing. Shareholders of companies like Snap are exempt from
filing obligations under Sections 13(d) and 13(g), which require anyone who owns
5% or of any class of a company’s equity to file a report with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.206 They are also exempt from the “short swing” profit rule
embodied in Section 16(b).207 That rule requires insiders to disgorge any profits on
trades that occur within six months of each other and is enforced by private right of
action.208 Without protection from this rule, insiders will have no obligation to
disclose when they profit from short swing trading, and shareholders will lack the
right to seek disgorgement of the profits.
In sum, shareholders of companies that offer only nonvoting stock to the public
will have much less information about the behavior of those who control the
company. In turn, those insiders will be able to ignore influence from informed
outside investors. For some companies, the benefits provided by insulating insiders
from interference may outweigh the risks, but this is unlikely to occur very often, and
even when it does, will unlikely to remain efficient into perpetuity. Therefore, a
requirement that companies make a non-negligible amount of voting shares available
to the public when issuing nonvoting shares would be least likely to impede efficient
structuring, while also protecting shareholders from inefficiencies in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

Nonvoting shares are under attack. Investors, regulators, and stock indices are
united in their view that nonvoting shares are tools of managerial entrenchment and
have supported proposals that would restrict companies from issuing them. But this
paper shows that nonvoting shares have important benefits. Specifically, the paper
posits that some combination of voting and nonvoting stock might well reduce
agency costs and prove to be a firm’s best way to attract capital. Weakly motivated
voters can get in the way of informed investors’ ability to discipline management;
accordingly, a company can better attract informed investors by issuing nonvoting
stock for the weakly motivated investors to buy. Moreover, weakly motivated voters
should prefer purchasing discounted stock that allows them to avoid duplicative
See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.14a. Snap will be required to file quarterly and
annual reports, as well as Form 8-K reports within four days of a material event. But these reports
require much less information than the proxy statement. The SEC in comment letters is urging Snap
to better disclose how it intends to address these issues. See Mark Butler, The SEC Reacts to Snap’s
Unconventional IPO (May 8, 2017), available at: https://www.intelligize.com/the-sec-reacts-to-snapsunconventional-ipo-2/.
206 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.13d; 13g.
207 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.16b.
208 Id.
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information gathering costs and other costs associated with voting. In sum, ex ante,
all investors should prefer a company in which nonvoting stock is available for
weakly motivated voters to buy.
For these reasons, recent stock index policy changes refusing to list companies
that issue nonvoting stock are misguided. These policies are a powerful deterrent to
companies that are considering whether to go public with a dual-class structure. And
when optimal forms of structuring are taken off of the table, the result is corporate
inefficiency and higher capital costs. If regulation is inevitable, a better form would
require companies that issue nonvoting stock to also issue voting stock, providing
investors a choice between engagement and passivity in governance.
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